CVE-2026-42600: MinIO: Path Traversal via msgpack Body in `ReadMultiple` Storage-REST Endpoint

Impact

What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?

A path traversal vulnerability in MinIO's ReadMultiple internode storage-REST endpoint allows a caller holding the cluster root JWT to read files from outside the configured drive roots, bounded only by the MinIO process UID.

Distributed-erasure (multi-node) MinIO deployments are impacted. Single-node standalone deployments do not register the route and are not affected. The attack requires an HS512 JWT signed with MINIOROOTPASSWORD and carrying accessKey = MINIOROOTUSER — the same secret every peer in the cluster holds to authenticate internode traffic, so a compromised peer or any actor in possession of the root credential can mint one.

The ReadMultiple handler (cmd/storage-rest-server.go) decodes a msgpack ReadMultipleReq body containing Bucket, Prefix, and Files fields and forwards them to xlStorage.ReadMultiple (cmd/xl-storage.go) without validation:

go volumeDir := pathJoin(s.drivePath, req.Bucket) // traversal resolves here for , f := range req.Files { fullPath := pathJoin(volumeDir, req.Prefix, f) data, mt, err = s.readAllDataWithDMTime(ctx, req.Bucket, volumeDir, fullPath) }

pathJoin calls path.Clean, which resolves .. components and produces an absolute path anywhere on the filesystem — it is not a root jail. The global setRequestValidityMiddleware rejects .. in r.URL.Path and r.Form but does not inspect request bodies, so msgpack-encoded traversal bypasses it. Sibling storage methods (StatInfoFile, ReadFileHandler, ReadVersion) validate their volume argument through s.getVolDir(volume), which rejects ..; ReadMultiple skips this call.

The attacker sends POST /minio/storage/{drivePath}/v63/rmpl with a msgpack-encoded body carrying ../ sequences in the Bucket field. The server opens the resulting path via os.OpenFile with ORDONLY|ONOATIME and returns its contents in the msgpack response stream.

Impact by deployment:

- Bare-metal with User=minio in the systemd unit — the ONOATIME ownership check bounds the read to files owned by the MinIO UID. Reachable secrets include TLS private keys, KMS/KES key material, systemd credentials, and data belonging to other tenants sharing the same UID on the host. Secrets leaked this way persist across cluster credential rotation.

- Containerized running as UID 0 (the historical default for the official Docker image, docker-compose examples, and Helm charts without securityContext.runAsNonRoot) — the primitive escalates to arbitrary host-filesystem disclosure: /etc/shadow, /root/, Kubernetes service-account tokens, cloud-init metadata caches.

Affected components: cmd/storage-rest-server.go (ReadMultiple handler), cmd/xl-storage.go (xlStorage.ReadMultiple).

CWE: CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory — 'Path Traversal')

CVSS v4.0 Score: 6.9 (Medium)

Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Affected Versions

All MinIO releases from RELEASE.2022-07-24T01-54-52Z through the final release of the minio/minio open-source project, RELEASE.2025-09-07T16-13-09Z.

The vulnerability was introduced in commit f939d1c18 ("Independent Multipart Uploads", PR #15346), which added the ReadMultiple storage-REST endpoint as part of the multipart upload redesign. The first affected release is RELEASE.2022-07-24T01-54-52Z.

Patches

Fixed in: MinIO AIStor RELEASE.2026-04-14T21-32-45Z (recommended upgrade target). The fix — which removed the ReadMultiple handler, the corresponding storage-driver method, the msgpack datatypes, the REST-client wrapper, and the route registration — first shipped in MinIO AIStor RELEASE.2024-10-23T19-38-07Z. Every AIStor release from RELEASE.2024-10-23T19-38-07Z onward is unaffected; users should upgrade to RELEASE.2026-04-14T21-32-45Z or later to pick up the accumulated fixes and improvements shipped since.

Binary Downloads

| Platform | Architecture | Download | | -------- | ------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Linux | amd64 | minio | | Linux | arm64 | minio | | macOS | arm64 | minio | | macOS | amd64 | minio | | Windows | amd64 | minio.exe |

FIPS Binaries

| Platform | Architecture | Download | | -------- | ------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Linux | amd64 | minio.fips | | Linux | arm64 | minio.fips |

Package Downloads

| Format | Architecture | Download | | ------ | ------------ | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | DEB | amd64 | minio20260414213245.0.0amd64.deb | | DEB | arm64 | minio20260414213245.0.0arm64.deb | | RPM | amd64 | minio-20260414213245.0.0-1.x8664.rpm | | RPM | arm64 | minio-20260414213245.0.0-1.aarch64.rpm |

Container Images

bash Standard docker pull quay.io/minio/aistor/minio:RELEASE.2026-04-14T21-32-45Z podman pull quay.io/minio/aistor/minio:RELEASE.2026-04-14T21-32-45Z

FIPS docker pull quay.io/minio/aistor/minio:RELEASE.2026-04-14T21-32-45Z.fips podman pull quay.io/minio/aistor/minio:RELEASE.2026-04-14T21-32-45Z.fips

Homebrew (macOS)

bash brew install minio/aistor/minio

Workarounds

- Users of the open-source minio/minio project should upgrade to MinIO AIStor RELEASE.2026-04-14T21-32-45Z or later.

If upgrading is not immediately possible:

- Rotate the root credential and restrict who holds it. The exploit requires a JWT signed with MINIOROOTPASSWORD. Treat the root credential as the host-filesystem disclosure primitive that it is: rotate it after any suspected exposure, store it only in the secret manager that bootstraps the cluster, and do not hand it to applications or operators who only need object-level access.

- Do not run the MinIO container as UID 0. Set securityContext.runAsNonRoot: true (and a non-zero runAsUser) in Kubernetes manifests, or add --user to docker run. This reduces the blast radius from arbitrary host-filesystem disclosure to MinIO-UID-owned files only.

- Restrict the internode storage-REST port at the network layer. In distributed deployments, the storage-REST route is served on the same port as the S3 API by default. Where feasible, use --internode-port to expose internode traffic on a separate interface reachable only from other cluster peers, and block that interface from client networks.

Credits

- Finders: Discovered by Claude, Anthropic's AI assistant, and triaged by Adrian Denkiewicz at Doyensec in collaboration with Anthropic Research.

Resources

- Introducing commit: f939d1c18 (PR #15346) - CWE-22 — Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory - CVE-2022-35919 — MinIO admin-authenticated path traversal in server-update endpoint (same class, different channel) - MinIO AIStor