CVE-2026-46337: WWBN AVideo: Unauthenticated Arbitrary Image Read via Path Traversal in `view/img/image404Raw.php`

Summary The endpoint requires no authentication. An unauthenticated remote attacker can read arbitrary image files anywhere on disk that the PHP user can open — including private user-profile photos that the application's normal serving wrappers gate behind ACLs, admin-uploaded thumbnails, encrypted-video poster frames, and image content under sibling-app directories reachable via .. traversal.

Details view/img/image404Raw.php reads the image GET parameter and joins it directly into a filesystem path served via readfile(). view/img/image404Raw.php (full file, current master @ 0dbadbcaaa1b415c7db078a72dc4b26d9fac0485):

php <?php

// Fetch requested image URL $imageURL = !empty($GET['image']) ? $GET['image'] : $SERVER["REQUESTURI"]; $rootDir = dirname(FILE) . '/../../'; if ($imageURL == 'favicon.ico') { $imgLocalFile = "{$rootDir}/videos/{$imageURL}"; } else { $imgLocalFile = "{$rootDir}/{$imageURL}"; // ← attacker-controlled }

if (fileexists($imgLocalFile)) { $imageInfo = getimagesize($imgLocalFile); // ← format gate if (empty($imageInfo)) { die('not image'); } // …extension → Content-Type mapping… header("HTTP/1.0 200 OK"); header('Content-Type: ' . $type); header('Content-Length: ' . filesize($imgLocalFile)); readfile($imgLocalFile); // ← exfil bytes exit; }

Issues:

1. No authentication. The file is reachable via direct GET; no require of globals.php, no session check, no API-key gate. 2. No basename / realpath / prefix containment. $GET['image'] is concatenated into $imgLocalFile with no .. filtering, no realpath() resolution, no allowlist check against the intended view/img/ directory. 3. getimagesize() is a magic-bytes check, not a path constraint. Any file on disk whose first bytes match a recognized image format (FFD8FF JPEG, 89504E47 PNG, 474946 GIF, 52494646…57454250 WebP) passes the gate — including images stored outside any ACL'd area of the application. 4. $SERVER["REQUESTURI"] fallback when image is empty widens the attack surface (path components in the URI itself land in $imgLocalFile).

Re-verified pre-submission on 2026-05-13 against view/img/image404Raw.php blob SHA c670b0faff4fbea1fd0508f179956975477d4340 — unsafe shape unchanged since first discovery on 2026-05-12.

Recommended fix — three layered checks, any one alone is insufficient:

php // view/img/image404Raw.php — proposed fix <?php

$imageURL = !empty($GET['image']) ? $GET['image'] : ''; if ($imageURL === '') { httpresponsecode(400); exit('bad request'); }

// 1. Reject any path-traversal segment outright. if (strpos($imageURL, '..') !== false || strpos($imageURL, "\0") !== false || strpos($imageURL, '://') !== false) { httpresponsecode(400); exit('bad request'); }

// 2. Resolve to a real path and verify prefix containment under the // intended image directory. $rootDir = realpath(dirname(FILE) . '/../../'); $imgLocalFile = realpath($rootDir . '/' . $imageURL); if ($imgLocalFile === false || (strpos($imgLocalFile, $rootDir . '/videos/') !== 0 && strpos($imgLocalFile, $rootDir . '/view/img/') !== 0)) { httpresponsecode(404); exit('not found'); }

// 3. Existing getimagesize() check stays as defense-in-depth. if (!isfile($imgLocalFile)) { httpresponsecode(404); exit('not found'); } $imageInfo = @getimagesize($imgLocalFile); if (empty($imageInfo)) { httpresponsecode(404); exit('not image'); }

// …rest of the original Content-Type + readfile() flow unchanged…

Drop the $SERVER["REQUESTURI"] fallback entirely; if no image parameter is provided, return 400.

PoC

Discovery probe — any HTTP client, no authentication, no cookies:

http GET /view/img/image404Raw.php?image=../videos/userPhoto/photo1.jpg HTTP/1.1 Host: avideo.example.com

If videos/userPhoto/photo1.jpg exists on the server, the response is the raw image bytes (HTTP 200, Content-Type: image/jpeg). The application's normal user-photo serving wrapper (which can gate by session / channel ownership) is bypassed entirely.

Cross-directory probe — read images outside the AVideo install root:

http GET /view/img/image404Raw.php?image=../../../var/www/other-app/uploads/users/admin.jpg HTTP/1.1 Host: avideo.example.com

If the PHP user has read access to a sibling app's image directory, those files are exfiltrable too.

Enumeration — iterate over predictable numeric IDs:

GET /view/img/image404Raw.php?image=../videos/userPhoto/photo1.jpg GET /view/img/image404Raw.php?image=../videos/userPhoto/photo2.jpg GET /view/img/image404Raw.php?image=../videos/userPhoto/photo3.jpg ...

…to harvest all profile images regardless of the application's intended privacy controls.

Impact

Path traversal → arbitrary image read (CWE-22 + CWE-284). Affects any AVideo deployment running master through commit 0dbadbca and likely every release on the supported branches. The attacker:

1. Bypasses the application's image-content ACLs. Profile photos under videos/userPhoto/ and admin-uploaded private thumbnails that AVideo's normal image-serving wrappers gate by session / channel ownership become readable to any anonymous internet user. 2. Reads images stored outside the AVideo install root. On shared-hosting / multi-tenant deployments, .. traversal lets the attacker page into sibling-app upload directories — anywhere the PHP user has read access on disk and the target file's first bytes form a valid image header. 3. Enables enumeration at scale. Numeric ID schemes (photo1.jpg, photo2.jpg, …) and predictable filenames let an attacker harvest every private image on a deployment without detection (each request looks like a single 200-image-OK to the web log).

Because the read primitive is restricted to image-magic-bytes files, there is no source-code or credential exfiltration via this primitive alone — but the privacy / GDPR exposure is substantial on any deployment that hosts user-uploaded photos. CVSS 5.3 (Medium) reflects the limited but real confidentiality impact; many operators will rate this higher because the leaked content is user-private by intent.

This is not a silent-fix disclosure — the bug is still present on current master at submission time; the maintainer is being notified of a previously-unknown issue.