CVE-2026-47080: CDATA Section Breakout via Unsanitised ]]> in xml_builder

Published Aug 21, 2026
·
Updated

XML Injection vulnerability in joshnuss xmlbuilder (XmlBuilder module) allows Content Spoofing, XML Injection.

This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/xmlbuilder.ex and program routines XmlBuilder.generate/1, XmlBuilder.generate/2, XmlBuilder.escape/1.

The escape/1 clause for {:cdata, data} in lib/xmlbuilder.ex concatenates data verbatim between the CDATA opener <![CDATA[ and closer ]]> without rewriting or splitting on the embedded ]]> sequence. Because CDATA sections have no internal escape mechanism, the only safe way to embed arbitrary bytes is to split on ]]> and emit adjacent CDATA sections. An attacker who can supply input containing ]]> closes the CDATA section early; any bytes that follow are parsed as ordinary XML markup by downstream consumers, allowing injection of arbitrary elements, text, or entity references into the output document.

This issue affects xmlbuilder: from 0.0.7 before 2.4.1.

Affected Software

1 affected component
xml_builder<2.4.1

Event History

Aug 21, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·09:49 AM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·09:49 AM
DescriptionWeakness

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which deployments are exposed?

Deployments using xml_builder versions from 0.0.7 through versions before 2.4.1 are affected when they place attacker-controlled data in a {:cdata, data} value processed by XmlBuilder.escape/1.

2

What must an attacker provide to exploit this issue?

The attacker needs control of content emitted as CDATA and must include the sequence ]]> followed by XML content. The sequence closes the generated CDATA section, causing following bytes to be interpreted as ordinary XML markup by downstream consumers.

3

Are all uses of xml_builder affected by default?

The vulnerable behavior is specific to the {:cdata, data} escape/1 clause. Uses that do not put untrusted input into CDATA are not described as exploitable by this issue.

4

What can be done if upgrading is not immediately possible?

Do not pass untrusted data as CDATA without handling embedded ]]> sequences. Split such data on ]]> and emit adjacent CDATA sections so the sequence cannot terminate a CDATA section early.

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