CVE-2026-48205: Apache Camel DNS: The dns.* and term Exchange header constants used non-Camel-prefixed names that bypass the HTTP header filter, allowing an HTTP client to influence internal behaviour

Published Jul 5, 2026
·
Updated

Improper Input Validation, Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Apache Camel DNS component.

The camel-dns producers read DNS operation parameters - the resolver to query, the name or domain to look up, the record type and class, and the search term - from Exchange message headers whose constant values (DnsConstants.DNSSERVER, DNSNAME, DNSDOMAIN, DNSTYPE, DNSCLASS, TERM) were the plain strings dns.server, dns.name, dns.domain, dns.type, dns.class and term. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into a dns: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set the dns.server header to make the dig producer build a SimpleResolver pointing at an attacker-controlled DNS server - a server-side request forgery via DNS, through which the attacker observes the queried name and can return poisoned responses - and set the dns.name / dns.domain headers to resolve arbitrary internal hostnames, disclosing whether they exist (internal network reconnaissance). No credentials are required when the bridging consumer is unauthenticated. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, routes that drive DNS operations via the raw header names must use CamelDnsServer / CamelDnsName / CamelDnsDomain / CamelDnsType / CamelDnsClass / CamelDnsTerm instead of the dns. / term names. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the dns. and term headers from any untrusted ingress before the dns: producer, and set the DNS server and lookup parameters from a trusted source in the route.

Affected Software

4 affected components
Apache Camel>=4.0.0<4.14.8, >=4.15.0<4.18.3, >=4.19.0<4.21.0
Apache Camel>=4.0.0<4.14.8
Apache Camel>=4.15.0<4.18.3
Apache Camel>=4.19.0<4.21.0

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade Apache Camel DNS to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 4.14.8
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade Apache Camel DNS to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 4.18.3
  3. Upgrade

    Upgrade Apache Camel DNS to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 4.21.0
  4. Configuration

    In routes that drive DNS operations via Exchange headers, use CamelDnsServer / CamelDnsName / CamelDnsDomain / CamelDnsType / CamelDnsClass / CamelDnsTerm instead of the dns.* and term header names so requests are blocked by HttpHeaderFilterStrategy at the HTTP boundary.

    Apache Camel DNS producer (dns:) HTTP header names used for DNS operation parameters (CamelDns* constants vs dns.*/term) = Use CamelDnsServer / CamelDnsName / CamelDnsDomain / CamelDnsType / CamelDnsClass / CamelDnsTerm instead of dns.server / dns.name / dns.domain / dns.type / dns.class / term
  5. Configuration

    For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the dns.* and term headers from any untrusted ingress before the dns: producer, and set DNS server and lookup parameters from a trusted source in the route.

    HTTP ingress (untrusted) Strip Exchange headers matching dns.* and term before dns: producer = Strip dns.* and term headers when ingress is untrusted

Event History

Jul 6, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·08:08 AM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·08:08 AM
DescriptionWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·09:16 AM
DescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software
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Frequently Asked Questions

1

What is the severity of CVE-2026-48205?

The severity of CVE-2026-48205 is rated as critical with a CVSS score of 9.1.

2

What is the impact of CVE-2026-48205?

CVE-2026-48205 allows an HTTP client to influence internal behavior due to improper input validation, potentially leading to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).

3

How do I fix CVE-2026-48205?

To fix CVE-2026-48205, upgrade to the patched version of Apache Camel that addresses this vulnerability.

4

What component is affected by CVE-2026-48205?

CVE-2026-48205 affects the Apache Camel DNS component specifically concerning its handling of DNS operation parameters.

5

How can CVE-2026-48205 be exploited?

CVE-2026-48205 can be exploited by an attacker manipulating the Exchange message headers to bypass HTTP header filters.

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