CVE-2026-48806: Sandbox `__toString()` policy bypass via dynamic mapping keys

Description

This is a residual bypass of CVE-2026-47732 / GHSA-pr2w-4gpj-cpq4 left after the initial fix for unguarded toString() calls.

In 3.26.0 the sandbox visitor was extended to wrap every child node that its parent will string-coerce at runtime with CheckToStringNode, gated by the new CoercesChildrenToStringInterface. ArrayExpression did not implement the interface for its mapping keys: when a dynamic key expression resolves to a Stringable object, ArrayExpression::compile() emits a raw (string) cast (via StringCastUnary for ContextVariable keys, and no cast at all for richer key expressions). PHP then invokes toString() directly, without ever calling SandboxExtension::ensureToStringAllowed().

A sandboxed template author can therefore trigger toString() on any object reachable in the render context by using it as a dynamic mapping key, for example:

twig {% set arr = {(obj): "value"} %}

Direct output of the same object is correctly blocked, which makes this a clear policy enforcement gap. The reliable demonstrated impact is unauthorised disclosure of data returned by toString().

Resolution

ArrayExpression now declares its dynamic mapping keys as string-coercion sites through CoercesChildrenToStringInterface, so the sandbox visitor wraps them with CheckToStringNode and the policy is consulted before PHP coerces the key to a string. The compiler also keeps an explicit (string) cast around the wrapped expression so PHP type errors on non-string keys are preserved.

As a side effect, any expression is now accepted as a dynamic mapping key (not only context variables); this is documented as a new feature on the 3.x branch.

Credits

Twig would like to thank El Kharoubi Iosif for reporting the issue and Fabien Potencier for providing the fix.