CVE-2026-49364: Apache Artemis, Apache Artemis, Apache ActiveMQ Artemis, Apache ActiveMQ Artemis: Pre-Authentication Cluster Credential Exposure to Discovered Peers

Published May 15, 2026
·
Updated

An unauthenticated network-adjacent attacker can leverage discovery to capture cluster administrative credentials during the initial cluster connection handshake.

This issue affects Apache Artemis: from 2.50.0 through 2.56.0; Apache ActiveMQ Artemis: from 1.0.0 through 2.44.0.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.57.0, which fixes the issue.

Other sources

initial report: Auth Bypass — Artemis cluster-password leaked to JGroups-spoofed peer → broker MANAGE takeover (JBoss EAP)

Composite authentication bypass: an attacker on the JGroups cluster backplane spoofs a discovery response to join the cluster, and the legitimate Artemis broker transmits its cluster-password in plaintext during the handshake; with this password the attacker authenticates to the CORE cluster channel via :8080 from any network position, gaining full MANAGE-level broker authority including message injection, journal access, and topology manipulation. findings/jboss-eap35.md

----- secarx findings: Prerequisites for exploitation:

1. JGroups network access: The attacker must be on the same multicast-reachable network segment as the JGroups private interface. In default configurations, the private interface binds to 127.0.0.1, so the attacker would need the administrator to have changed jboss.bind.address.private to a routable address (which is required for actual multi-node clustering to work). In any real HA deployment, this address is set to a routable interface. 2. Cluster password capture: If the administrator has not set an explicit cluster-password (left as "CHANGE ME!!"), each node generates a different random UUID and clustering is broken. In any functioning HA deployment, the administrator has set a shared password. When the legitimate broker initiates a ClusterConnectionBridge to the attacker's spoofed node, the CreateSessionMessage containing this shared password is sent in plaintext. The attacker captures it passively. 3. Port 8080 reachability: The attacker must have TCP access to port 8080 on any cluster member. This port is the standard application HTTP port and is typically accessible from client networks.

Attack flow:

Step 1 — The attacker responds to JGroups PING/MPING discovery on the cluster backplane, advertising a spoofed broker endpoint. No AUTH is checked.

Step 2 — A legitimate broker node establishes a ClusterConnectionBridge to the attacker's spoofed endpoint, sending a CreateSessionMessage containing the cluster user and password in plaintext. The attacker captures the password.

Step 3 — From any network position that can reach port 8080, the attacker performs an HTTP upgrade to the CORE protocol (no authentication required for the upgrade itself).

Step 4 — The attacker sends a CreateSessionMessage with username=ACTIVEMQ.CLUSTER.ADMIN.USER and password=the captured value. Artemis SecurityStoreImpl authenticates this internally, bypassing Elytron and all RBAC checks.

Step 5 — The attacker has full MANAGE-level authority: message injection and consumption on all addresses, queue creation and deletion, journal access through management operations, and topology manipulation.

There are some major network level pre-requisites and because of that it should be considered as Important but not Critical. Should be filed as a new CVE and trackers should be created as EAP 8.0 and 8.1 are in full support and should fix this CVE.

— Red Hat

Affected Software

4 affected components
Apache ARTEMIS>=2.50.0<=2.56.0
Apache ActiveMQ Artemis>=1.0.0<=2.44.0
Apache ARTEMIS>=1.0.0<2.44.0
Apache ARTEMIS>=2.50.0<2.57.0

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade Apache ActiveMQ Artemis to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.57.0

Event History

May 15, 2026
Data Sourced
via Red Hat·07:39 PM
DescriptionSeverityAffected Software
Sep 10, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·04:49 AM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·04:49 AM
DescriptionWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·05:17 AM
DescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which deployments are exposed?

Deployments running Apache Artemis 2.50.0 through 2.56.0 or Apache ActiveMQ Artemis 1.0.0 through 2.44.0 are affected. Exposure requires cluster discovery to be reachable by a network-adjacent unauthenticated attacker.

2

What does an attacker need to exploit this issue?

An attacker must be network-adjacent and able to leverage the broker's discovery mechanism. No authentication is required before the initial cluster connection handshake in the affected versions.

3

What information can be exposed?

The attacker can capture cluster administrative credentials during the initial cluster connection handshake.

4

What is the available remediation?

Upgrade to Apache Artemis version 2.57.0, which fixes the issue.

Contact

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