CVE-2026-52723: ePA 3.x Integration: VAU Server Authentication Bypass via Circular Certificate Trust

Published Aug 18, 2026
·
Updated

ePA 3.x Integration implements the authorization workflow and writes Medical Information Objects to Germany's electronic patient record. Prior to 1.3.0, ePA 3.x Integration performs VAU server certificate validation in app/vau/VAUProtokoll.py without anchoring the signedvauserverpubkeys and AUTVAUCertData certificate path to independent trusted material. A network-positioned attacker between the DiGA backend and the ePA system can intercept the VAU handshake, supply attacker-controlled certificate and key material, and satisfy the circular trust relationship. Because TLS certificate verification is also disabled in affected versions, no independent server-authentication layer prevents the attack. The attacker can impersonate the VAU server, control the negotiated session keys, and read or modify all encrypted VAU traffic. This issue is fixed in version 1.3.0.

Affected Software

1 affected component
ePA 3.x Integration<1.3.0

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade ePA 3.x Integration to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 1.3.0

Event History

Aug 18, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·04:50 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·04:50 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which deployments should be treated as vulnerable?

Deployments running versions earlier than 1.3.0 are affected. The issue is fixed in version 1.3.0.

2

What access does an attacker need to exploit this issue?

An attacker needs a network position between the DiGA backend and the ePA system to intercept the VAU handshake. No privileges or user interaction are required.

3

Why does the VAU handshake accept an attacker-controlled server identity?

Affected versions disable TLS certificate verification and do not anchor the VAU certificate path and signed public keys to independent trusted material. An attacker can therefore provide controlled certificate and key material that satisfies the circular trust relationship.

4

What is the impact of successful exploitation?

A successful attacker can impersonate the VAU server, control negotiated session keys, and read or modify encrypted VAU traffic. This can affect Medical Information Objects handled through the authorization workflow.

Contact

SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
132 Wickham Terrace
Fortitude Valley,
QLD 4006, Australia
info@secalerts.co
By using SecAlerts services, you agree to our services end-user license agreement. This website is safeguarded by reCAPTCHA and governed by the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service. All names, logos, and brands of products are owned by their respective owners, and any usage of these names, logos, and brands for identification purposes only does not imply endorsement. If you possess any content that requires removal, please get in touch with us.
© 2026 SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
ABN: 70 645 966 203, ACN: 645 966 203