CVE-2026-53532: OpenEXR: Unhandled assert abort in HTJ2K decoder via crafted QCD marker (DoS)

Published Aug 24, 2026
·
Updated

OpenEXR is the reference implementation and specification for the EXR image format, widely used in the motion picture industry. In versions 3.4.0 through 3.4.12, a crafted HTJ2K-compressed EXR file causes an unconditional process abort in any application that calls exrstartread() on untrusted input, resulting in denial of service. The crash is triggered by a QCD marker whose lower five bits are zero, which OpenEXR passes into the vendored OpenJPH library while constructing the codestream and evaluating its quantization delta parameters. OpenJPH uses an assertion rather than a recoverable error to validate those bits, so any invalid value calls abort() directly and cannot be intercepted by surrounding error handling, a problem compounded by OpenEXR wrapping only its internal HT header parser in error handling while leaving the later codestream read and construction calls unprotected. This issue has been resolved in version 3.4.13.

Affected Software

2 affected components
OpenEXR OpenEXR>=3.4.0<=3.4.12
OpenEXR OpenEXR=3.4.13

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade OpenEXR to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 3.4.13

Event History

Aug 24, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·10:24 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·10:24 PM
DescriptionWeakness

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which deployments are exposed to this denial of service?

Applications using OpenEXR versions 3.4.0 through 3.4.12 are exposed if they call exr_start_read() on untrusted EXR input. The affected input must use HTJ2K compression.

2

What does an attacker need to trigger the crash?

An attacker needs to supply a crafted HTJ2K-compressed EXR file containing a QCD marker with its lower five bits set to zero. Processing that file through exr_start_read() causes the process to abort.

3

Can application error handling prevent the affected process from terminating?

No. The invalid marker reaches an assertion in the vendored OpenJPH library, which calls abort() directly; surrounding error handling cannot intercept it.

4

What should teams do if they process untrusted EXR files?

Upgrade to OpenEXR 3.4.13, where the issue is resolved. Until upgrading, avoid calling exr_start_read() on untrusted HTJ2K-compressed EXR files.

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