CVE-2026-53942: Conda Organization Infrastructure: Pwn Request in update workflow allows PR-controlled template rendering with SYNC_TOKEN
Conda Organization Infrastructure is a centralized location for infrastructure codes. Prior to commit 9c0f238, a GitHub Actions Pwn Request vulnerability appears to remain present in conda/conda. The affected workflow is .github/workflows/update.yml. It is triggered by issuecomment events containing @conda-bot render or @conda-bot recreate. For the render path, the workflow obtains the pull request head repository and branch from the PR API, checks out that PR-controlled repository/ref using secrets.SYNCTOKEN, and then runs conda/actions/template-files@7f6830b1428a9bd47f0b068892c77eae95207037. The external template-files action reads its default configuration and templates from the checked-out working directory. In the confirmed finding, that action uses an unsandboxed Jinja2 environment to render attacker-controlled template content. This creates a Pwn Request chain in which an untrusted PR/comment path can reach template rendering in a privileged token context. This issue has been patched via commit 9c0f238.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade to a fixed release to a version that resolves this vulnerability.
Patch 9c0f238
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What must an attacker be able to control to reach the vulnerable path?
The attacker needs an untrusted pull request whose head repository and branch can be checked out, plus an issue comment containing either @conda-bot render or @conda-bot recreate. The render path then processes template content from the PR-controlled checkout.
Does exploitation require changing the trusted workflow itself?
No. The workflow retrieves the pull request head repository and ref from the PR API and checks out that PR-controlled ref using SYNC_TOKEN. The template-files action reads its default configuration and templates from that checked-out working directory.
How can maintainers determine whether their workflow is affected?
Inspect .github/workflows/update.yml for issue_comment handling of @conda-bot render or @conda-bot recreate, a checkout of the PR head repository/ref using secrets.SYNC_TOKEN, and execution of conda/actions/template-files@7f6830b1428a9bd47f0b068892c77eae95207037. The issue is described as present before commit 9c0f238.
What is the available remediation?
Apply the patch in commit 9c0f23857282ff5cf7a6b3ad6bf0dd6f9974be55. No separate temporary mitigation is specified in the provided information.