CVE-2026-54144: OpenHuman: Embedded Google Meet webview can silently capture the macOS desktop without a user gesture
OpenHuman is an open-source agent harness available as a desktop application and Rust library. Before 0.56.0 on macOS, the runtime injected into a supported remote account webview such as Google Meet allows page JavaScript to call getDisplayMedia without a live user gesture. Instead of rejecting the request, the shim falls through to native Chromium capture behavior, and the embedded CEF environment can auto-select the primary display because it lacks the normal desktop-media picker. If OpenHuman already has macOS Screen Recording permission and an attacker obtains JavaScript execution in an allowed embedded origin, the attacker can obtain a real desktop capture stream without a new user gesture. The stream can expose chats, documents, source code, email, meeting content, credentials, one-time codes, and other visible desktop information. The separate direct screensharebeginsession IPC path failing origin validation does not prevent exploitation through getDisplayMedia. This issue is fixed in version 0.56.0.
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
OpenHumanto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.56.0
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are exposed to this issue?
OpenHuman desktop application deployments on macOS running versions before 0.56.0 are exposed when the application has been granted macOS Screen Recording permission and uses a supported remote account webview such as Google Meet.
What does an attacker need to exploit it?
An attacker needs JavaScript execution in an allowed embedded origin. Exploitation also requires that OpenHuman already has macOS Screen Recording permission; no new user gesture is required for the display-capture request.
Is interaction required at the time of capture?
No live user gesture is required once the stated conditions are met. The embedded CEF environment can auto-select the primary display because it lacks the normal desktop-media picker.
What should teams do if they cannot immediately upgrade?
The provided data identifies version 0.56.0 as the fix. Until upgrading, removing or withholding macOS Screen Recording permission from OpenHuman prevents the described desktop-capture condition.
What information could be exposed if exploitation succeeds?
The attacker can obtain a real desktop capture stream from the primary display. Visible chats, documents, source code, email, meeting content, credentials, and one-time codes may be exposed.