CVE-2026-54588: Poweradmin has Host Header Injection in OIDC redirect_uri, SAML ACS/SLO URL, and Logout Redirect Construction.

Published Jun 23, 2026
·
Updated

Summary Poweradmin v4.3.2 uses the attacker-controlled HTTPHOST request header as the authoritative source for building callback URLs in its OIDC, SAML, and logout authentication flows without any validation. An unauthenticated attacker can poison the redirecturi sent to the Identity Provider, causing the IdP to redirect the victim's authorization code to an attacker-controlled server - resulting in full account takeover with no credentials required.

Three independent code paths are affected:

- Primary (Critical): OidcService::getCallbackUrl() - redirecturi poisoning - Secondary (High): SamlConfigurationService::getBaseUrl() - SAML ACS/SLO URL poisoning - Tertiary (Medium): LogoutController::getBaseUrl() - post-logout redirect poisoning

Details

Root Cause

The application constructs absolute URLs dynamically from HTTPHOST rather than from a trusted configured base URL. The header is fully client-controlled and is not validated before use in any authentication flow.

Poweradmin's own codebase contains the correct pattern - DocsController::getValidatedHost() (line 244) calls isValidHostname() before using the value - but this was never applied to authentication flows.

### Primary: lib/Application/Service/OidcService.php (~line 460)

php private function getCallbackUrl(): string { $scheme = $this->detectScheme(); // HTTPHOST taken directly with zero validation $host = $this->request->getServerParam('HTTPHOST', 'localhost'); $basePrefix = $this->configManager->get('interface', 'baseurlprefix', ''); return $scheme . '://' . $host . $basePrefix . '/oidc/callback'; }

HTTPHOST is embedded verbatim as redirecturi in the OAuth 2.0 authorization request sent to the IdP. HTTPXFORWARDEDPROTO is similarly used unvalidated for scheme detection.

Secondary: lib/Application/Service/SamlConfigurationService.php (~line 134)

private function getBaseUrl(): string { $configuredBaseUrl = $this->configManager->get('interface', 'baseurl', ''); if (!empty($configuredBaseUrl)) { return rtrim($configuredBaseUrl, '/'); // safe path - rarely configured } // Falls through on every default installation $host = $SERVER['HTTPHOST'] ?? 'localhost'; ... return $scheme . '://' . $host . $prefix; }

Used to construct SAML ACS URL, SLO URL, and entity ID - all poisonable via Host header. The safe fallback only activates when interface.baseurl is explicitly set, which is optional and empty by default.

Tertiary: lib/Application/Controller/LogoutController.php (~line 272)

Same $SERVER['HTTPHOST'] pattern used for post-logout redirect URL construction.

PoC Environment: Poweradmin v4.3.2, Docker, PHP 8.2, OIDC enabled, interface.baseurl empty (default).

docker exec poweradmin-container php -r " require '/app/vendor/autoload.php'; putenv('PACONFIGPATH=/app/config/settings.php');

use PowerAdmin\Application\Service\OidcService; use PowerAdmin\Infrastructure\Configuration\ConfigurationManager; use PowerAdmin\Infrastructure\Web\Request;

\$SERVER['HTTPHOST'] = 'attacker.com'; \$SERVER['HTTPS'] = '';

\$config = ConfigurationManager::getInstance(); \$request = new Request(); \$oidcService = new OidcService(\$config, \$request); \$authUrl = \$oidcService->initiateAuthFlow('test');

parsestr(parseurl(\$authUrl, PHPURLQUERY), \$p); echo 'redirecturi: ' . urldecode(\$p['redirecturi']) . PHPEOL;

if (strcontains(\$p['redirecturi'], 'attacker.com')) { echo '[CONFIRMED] Host header injection successful' . PHPEOL; } "

Output:

redirecturi: http://attacker.com/oidc/callback

[CONFIRMED] Host header injection successful - redirecturi contains attacker.com

The redirecturi in the authorization request sent to the Identity Provider is http://attacker.com/oidc/callback. The victim's authorization code will be delivered to this URL upon successful authentication.

Note on PKCE: PKCE does not mitigate this attack. The attacker initiates the flow themselves and controls both codechallenge and codeverifier.

Impact Direct Impact

An attacker who can send a request with a spoofed Host header - directly or via a misconfigured reverse proxy (proxysetheader Host $httphost is the nginx default) - can steal any user's authorization code and gain full authenticated access to Poweradmin. No credentials, malware, or prior access required.

DNS Infrastructure Impact

Poweradmin manages PowerDNS. A compromised administrator account grants full DNS zone control, enabling:

- MX hijacking - redirect all inbound email to attacker's mail server; intercept password reset emails and 2FA codes for any third-party service registered with the domain - SPF/DKIM manipulation - add attacker's IP to SPF, publish attacker's DKIM key → send cryptographically authenticated email as the organization (passes DMARC) - Subdomain takeover - point mail., vpn., app. to attacker infrastructure - SSL certificate theft - remove CAA records and complete ACME DNS-01 challenge to obtain wildcard certificate .company.com from any CA - Full domain delegation - delegate subdomains to attacker nameserver

CVSS v3.1

┌──────────────────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┬──────────────┐ │ Scenario │ Vector │ Score │ ├──────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────┼──────────────┤ │ Standard deployment │ AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L │ 8.2 High │ ├──────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────┼──────────────┤ │ Proxy misconfigured ($httphost) │ AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L │ 9.3 Critical │ └──────────────────────────────────┴─────────────────────────────────────┴──────────────┘

Recommended Fix

Immediate mitigation: Set interface.baseurl in config/settings.php - activates the safe branch in SamlConfigurationService immediately.

Code fix for OidcService: Prefer the configured base URL; if absent, validate HTTPHOST via filtervar($hostname, FILTERVALIDATEDOMAIN, FILTERFLAGHOSTNAME) before use - the same pattern already implemented in DocsController::getValidatedHost().

Other sources

Poweradmin has Host Header Injection in OIDC redirecturi, SAML ACS/SLO URL, and Logout Redirect Construction.

— Packagist

Poweradmin is a web-based DNS administration tool for PowerDNS server. Versions prior to 4.2.4 and 4.3.3 use the attacker-controlled HTTPHOST request header as the authoritative source for building callback URLs in its OIDC, SAML, and logout authentication flows without any validation. An unauthenticated attacker can poison the redirecturi sent to the Identity Provider, causing the IdP to redirect the victim's authorization code to an attacker-controlled server - resulting in full account takeover with no credentials required. Versions 4.2.4 and 4.3.3 patch the issue.

— MITRE

Affected Software

5 affected componentsFixes available
Poweradmin Poweradmin<4.2.4, <4.3.3
composer/poweradmin/poweradmin>=4.3.0<4.3.3
4.3.3
composer/poweradmin/poweradmin<4.2.4
4.2.4
composer/poweradmin/poweradmin>=4.3.0, <4.3.3
4.3.3
composer/poweradmin/poweradmin<4.2.4
4.2.4

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade composer/poweradmin/poweradmin to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 4.3.3
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade composer/poweradmin/poweradmin to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 4.2.4
  3. Upgrade

    Upgrade Poweradmin to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 4.2.4
  4. Upgrade

    Upgrade Poweradmin to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 4.3.3
  5. Configuration

    Immediate mitigation: set interface.base_url in config/settings.php so redirect_uri/base URL construction prefers the configured base URL instead of falling back to client-controlled HTTP_HOST.

    Poweradmin interface.base_url = set a non-empty configured base URL in config/settings.php

Event History

Jun 23, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·10:09 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·10:09 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·11:16 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Jul 28, 2026
Advisory Published
via GitHub·04:40 PM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·04:40 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software
Data Sourced
via Packagist·04:40 PM
DescriptionSeverityAffected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

What is the severity of CVE-2026-54588?

CVE-2026-54588 has a critical severity rating of 9.6.

2

How do I fix CVE-2026-54588?

To fix CVE-2026-54588, upgrade to Poweradmin version 4.2.4 or 4.3.3 to address the host header injection vulnerability.

3

What impact does CVE-2026-54588 have on systems?

CVE-2026-54588 may allow attackers to perform unauthorized actions by exploiting the host header injection vulnerability.

4

Which versions of Poweradmin are affected by CVE-2026-54588?

Poweradmin versions prior to 4.2.4 and 4.3.3 are affected by CVE-2026-54588.

5

What type of vulnerability is CVE-2026-54588 classified as?

CVE-2026-54588 is classified as an Input Validation vulnerability.

Contact

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