CVE-2026-55419: Reachy Mini: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type
Summary
The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms. An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.
Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access
This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:
1. Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API \<= current finding 2. Bluetooth Authentication Bypass 3. Bluetooth Directory Traversal
Description
The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload\sound” method:
py @router.post("/sounds/upload") async def uploadsound( file: UploadFile = File(...), ) -> dict[str, str]: """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory. The file is saved to /tmp/reachyminisounds/<originalfilename>. If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten. Returns: JSON with the absolute path of the saved file on the daemon. """ if not file.filename: raise HTTPException(statuscode=400, detail="Filename is required") # Reject path traversal filename = Path(file.filename).name if not filename or filename in (".", ".."): raise HTTPException(statuscode=400, detail="Invalid filename") os.makedirs(SOUNDSTMPDIR, existok=True) dest = os.path.join(SOUNDSTMPDIR, filename) content = await file.read() with open(dest, "wb") as f: f.write(content) return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}
This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:
1. No authentication mechanism. 2. No file extension validation. 3. No file content/size validation.
Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow\origins=\[“\”\] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.
PoC
1. Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):
shell .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachymini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media
2. After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:
shell curl -X POST http://<daemondomain>:<daemonport>/api/media/sounds/upload \ -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"
3. Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:
shell curl -X POST http://<daemondomain>:<daemonport>/api/media/sounds/upload \ -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"
4. Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.
Impact
Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.
Fix suggestion
Perform the following check on the API endpoint:
1. Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach). 2. Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type). 3. Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.
Credit
The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.
Other sources
Reachy Mini is an SDK for controlling Reachy Mini robots. Prior to 1.8.2, the Reachy Mini daemon exposes the /api/media/sounds/upload endpoint implemented by the uploadsound method in src/reachymini/daemon/app/routers/media.py without authentication, file-extension checks, content validation, or size validation. The daemon binds to 0.0.0.0 by default and uses permissive CORS alloworigins=[""], allowing an unauthenticated network attacker to upload arbitrary file types that are written to /tmp/reachyminisounds/<originalfilename>. Malicious files can compromise stored-data integrity and can serve as a foothold when combined with other vulnerabilities. This issue is fixed in version 1.8.2.
— MITRE
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
pip/reachy-minito a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.8.2 - Upgrade
Upgrade
Reachy Mini daemonto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.8.2 - Configuration
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint /api/media/sounds/upload (implemented by upload_sound in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/routers/media.py).
Reachy Mini daemon (/api/media/sounds/upload) authentication = required - Configuration
Remove permissive CORS usage (the daemon uses allow_origins=["*"] by default); configure CORS to only allow trusted origins so the upload API is not exposed to arbitrary web origins.
Reachy Mini daemon (/api/media/sounds/upload) CORS allow_origins = ["*"] -> restrictive allow-list - Configuration
Do not bind the daemon to 0.0.0.0 by default; bind only to the required/trusted network interfaces to reduce exposure of /api/media/sounds/upload.
Reachy Mini daemon network binding host bind address = 0.0.0.0 -> trusted interface(s) only - Configuration
Add file extension allow-list validation in upload_sound so only desired extensions are accepted (current behavior has no file extension validation; filenames are saved using Path(file.filename).name).
Reachy Mini daemon (/api/media/sounds/upload) file-extension validation = allow-list only desired extensions - Configuration
Validate that uploaded file content matches the allowed extension (magic numbers / known file structure per file type), instead of accepting arbitrary content.
Reachy Mini daemon (/api/media/sounds/upload) file content validation = required - Configuration
Add uploaded file size validation in upload_sound (current behavior has no size validation) to reject oversized uploads.
Reachy Mini daemon (/api/media/sounds/upload) file size validation = required