CVE-2026-55575: LiquidJS: `pop` filter bypasses `memoryLimit` accounting that its array-filter siblings enforce

pop filter bypasses memoryLimit accounting that its array-filter siblings enforce

CWE: CWE-770 (Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling) — sibling class of GHSA-8xx9-69p8-7jp3 and GHSA-2546-xv4c-mc8g, applied to memoryLimit instead of renderLimit

Summary

The pop array filter at src/filters/array.ts:91-95 allocates a full clone of its input array via [...toArray(v)] but does not call this.context.memoryLimit.use(...) the way every other array-clone filter in the same file does (shift, unshift, compact, concat, reverse, sample, slice, map, sortBy, where, groupby, uniq). This silently disables the memoryLimit budget for {{ hugearray | pop }}, letting a template render allocate an O(N) clone of an attacker-influenced array regardless of how strictly memoryLimit is set.

Affected

- liquidjs ≥ all versions that ship the current pop filter implementation (verified 10.27.0, HEAD a8fd734b5) - Deployments where any template uses {{ arr | pop }} on an array whose length is influenced by untrusted input (typical multi-tenant context arrays: orders, log lines, catalog entries, user lists, etc.)

Vulnerability details

Code

src/filters/array.ts:91-95:

ts export function pop<T> (v: T[]): T[] { const clone = [...toArray(v)] // O(N) allocation — not charged to memoryLimit clone.pop() return clone }

Note: the function signature does not even declare this: FilterImpl, so it has no typed access to this.context.memoryLimit at the type level — a visual tell that the author skipped the limit-accounting boilerplate the surrounding filters use.

Compare with shift (src/filters/array.ts:97-103), which is functionally identical except for the array-end operated on:

ts export function shift<T> (this: FilterImpl, v: T[]): T[] { const array = toArray(v) this.context.memoryLimit.use(array.length) // ← guard present const clone = [...array] clone.shift() return clone }

And unshift, compact, concat, reverse, sample, slice, map, sortBy, where, groupby, uniq — all of which also charge memoryLimit.use(array.length) (or lhs.length + rhs.length etc.) before allocating their working buffer.

The asymmetry confirms pop is an accidental omission, not by design.

Why the bypass matters

memoryLimit is the documented control for bounding the memory a single render() call may allocate (docs/source/tutorials/dos.md). Every array-output filter in src/filters/array.ts other than pop deducts its working set from the limit, so a render that does {{ huge | shift }} with memoryLimit: 100 and huge.length === 5000000 correctly throws memory alloc limit exceeded. The identical {{ huge | pop }} does not throw — the allocation proceeds, and the only ceiling is the Node process's heap.

Proof of concept

js const { Liquid } = require('liquidjs');

const l = new Liquid({ memoryLimit: 100 }); // 100-unit budget const huge = Array(5000000).fill('x'); // 5M-element context array

(async () => { try { await l.parseAndRender('{{ a | shift | size }}', { a: huge }); } catch (e) { console.log('shift: ' + e.message); } // expected: memory alloc limit exceeded

try { await l.parseAndRender('{{ a | unshift: 0 | size }}', { a: huge }); } catch (e) { console.log('unshift: ' + e.message); } // expected: memory alloc limit exceeded

const out = await l.parseAndRender('{{ a | pop | size }}', { a: huge }); console.log('pop: OK, size=' + out); // size=4999999 — allocation succeeded })();

Observed (against dist/liquid.node.js at a8fd734b5):

shift: memory alloc limit exceeded, line:1, col:1 unshift: memory alloc limit exceeded, line:1, col:1 pop: OK, size=4999999

Impact

- memoryLimit does not bound pop allocations. Any template that can reach {{ <untrusted-sized array> | pop }} allocates an O(N) clone outside the budget. - Realistic attack surface: when a server passes an attacker-influenced large array to the template context (search results, paginated lists, batch-export pages) and the template uses | pop anywhere on it, a single render can allocate hundreds of MB of array slots that the operator believed memoryLimit had ruled out. - Concurrent amplification: N parallel requests each allocate their own unguarded clone — the practical ceiling is the Node process heap, after which the host runs oom-kill. This is the same outcome the renderLimit-empty-body advisories (GHSA-8xx9-69p8-7jp3 / GHSA-2546-xv4c-mc8g) prevented for CPU; this report prevents it for memory.

Severity is configuration-dependent (requires memoryLimit to be set, plus a template that uses pop, plus attacker-influenced array length). For deployments that rely on memoryLimit as a DoS guard, this is a real bypass of that guard.

Workaround for users

Until a fix lands, deployments relying on memoryLimit should either:

- Avoid | pop in templates whose inputs include untrusted-length arrays. Use | slice: 0, arr.size | minus: 1 or equivalent guarded alternatives. - Register a wrapping pop filter that does the accounting:

js liquid.registerFilter('pop', function (v) { const arr = Array.from(v ?? []); this.context.memoryLimit.use(arr.length); arr.pop(); return arr; });

Suggested fix

One-line addition mirroring shift:

ts export function pop<T> (this: FilterImpl, v: T[]): T[] { const array = toArray(v) this.context.memoryLimit.use(array.length) // ← add this line, and add this: FilterImpl const clone = [...array] clone.pop() return clone }

No API or behavior change for callers within budget; rejects out-of-budget calls with the standard memory alloc limit exceeded exception the sibling filters already throw.