CVE-2026-55962: TLS 1.3 post-handshake authentication: server accepts Finished without client Certificate/CertificateVerify

TLS 1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA) issue where a server could accept a client's Finished message without the client having sent a Certificate and CertificateVerify. The post-handshake-auth exemption that allows an empty/absent peer certificate was only intended for the initial handshake, but it was also being applied while a post-handshake CertificateRequest was still outstanding. The check is now scoped to the initial handshake only: on the server, once a post-handshake CertificateRequest has been sent (certReqCtx is set), a peer certificate and a valid CertificateVerify are required again before the Finished is accepted, with empty-certificate handling following the configured verify mode (FAILIFNOPEERCERT) just as during first-handshake client authentication. Only affects TLS 1.3 servers built with post-handshake authentication support (WOLFSSLPOSTHANDSHAKEAUTH / --enable-postauth, included in --enable-all) that enable WOLFSSLVERIFYPOSTHANDSHAKE and request a client certificate after the handshake via wolfSSLrequestcertificate(). Clients, and servers that do not use post-handshake authentication, are unaffected.