CVE-2026-57147: praisonai-platform: default JWT signing secret 'dev-secret-change-me' enables token forgery
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 0.1.6, praisonaiplatform/services/authservice.py assigns the public dev-secret-change-me value to JWTSECRET when PLATFORMJWTSECRET is unset, and its production guard does not run when PLATFORMENV is also unset because that setting defaults to dev. A remote unauthenticated attacker can mint an HS256 token with an arbitrary sub and email, and the platform's AuthService.verifytoken() and getcurrentuser dependency accept the forged identity for protected API routes. This vulnerability is fixed in praisonai-platform 0.1.6.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
praisonai-platformto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.1.6 - Configuration
Ensure PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET is explicitly set so JWT_SECRET does not fall back to the default 'dev-secret-change-me' used prior to 0.1.6.
praisonai-platform AuthService PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET = set to a strong non-default secret (do not leave unset) - Configuration
Ensure PLATFORM_ENV is explicitly set so the production guard runs (prior to 0.1.6, the guard did not run when PLATFORM_ENV was also unset and defaulted to dev).
praisonai-platform AuthService PLATFORM_ENV = set to a non-dev (production-like) environment value
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are exposed?
PraisonAI-platform versions prior to 0.1.6 are exposed when PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET is unset. If PLATFORM_ENV is also unset, it defaults to dev, so the production guard does not run and the public fallback secret is used.
Does exploitation require an account or user interaction?
No. A remote attacker does not need authentication or user interaction; they can create an HS256 JWT containing arbitrary sub and email claims.
What access can a forged token obtain?
The AuthService token verification and get_current_user dependency accept the forged identity for protected API routes. This can allow the attacker to authenticate as an arbitrary identity presented in the token.
What should be done if an immediate upgrade is not possible?
Set PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET to a non-public secret rather than leaving it unset. Upgrade to praisonai-platform 0.1.6 when possible.
How can I determine whether an instance is affected?
Check whether the deployment runs a version earlier than 0.1.6 and whether PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET is unset. Also check whether PLATFORM_ENV is unset, since it then defaults to dev and bypasses the production guard.