CVE-2026-59167: SunEditor: Critical XSS vulnerability - sanitizer bypass
Summary
SUNEDITOR v2.47.10 appears to allow JavaScript execution through crafted namespaced HTML elements.
The sanitization logic does not fully remove executable event-handler attributes from certain custom/namespaced tags. As a result, an attacker may be able to inject HTML content that executes JavaScript when the rendered element is interacted with.
This behavior was observed after the changes introduced in this commit:
https://github.com/JiHong88/suneditor/commit/9ed405fb0de676e56cd0e6a13c19c103ad5948d3
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Affected Version
Confirmed vulnerable:
SUNEDITOR =< 2.47.10
Potentially affected:
Previous versions, if the same sanitization logic is still present
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Proof of Concept
The following payload preserves an executable event handler:
html <a:b src="/x"><iframe src=javascript:alert(1)></iframe></a:b>
<p><a:b src="/x" onclick="document.body.style.background='red'">click</a:b></p>
Simplified PoC:
html <a:b src="/x" onclick="console.log('XSS:',document.domain,document.cookie)">click</a:b>
html <p><a:b src="/x" onmouseover="alert('XSS — '+document.domain)">📎 Click here for solutions</a:b></p> ---
Steps to Reproduce
1. Open SUNEDITOR using version 2.47.10. 2. Insert the payload above into the editor. 3. Save or render the generated content. 4. Click the generated element. 5. Observe that JavaScript is executed.
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Impact
This may allow an attacker to inject arbitrary JavaScript into rendered editor content.
Depending on how SUNEDITOR is integrated into an application, this could lead to:
Stored XSS DOM manipulation Session theft Credential theft Account takeover actions performed in the victim’s browser context
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Technical Details
The issue appears to be related to incomplete handling of namespaced/custom HTML elements such as:
html <a:b>
Event-handler attributes such as onclick can remain attached to these crafted elements and execute when interacted with.
This suggests that the sanitization process may not consistently normalize and validate custom or namespaced elements before applying attribute filtering.
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Suggested Remediation
Possible mitigations include:
Normalize DOM elements before sanitization. Explicitly reject or unwrap unknown/custom/namespaced tags. Strip all event-handler attributes from all elements, including unknown/custom elements. Re-validate sanitized output after browser DOM parsing. Add regression tests for namespaced/custom tag payloads.
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Other sources
SunEditor is a lightweight and powerful WYSIWYG editor in vanilla JavaScript with no dependencies. Prior to 2.47.11, the sanitizer in src/lib/core.js does not consistently reject namespaced or custom HTML elements, allowing event-handler attributes to remain on crafted elements. When an application renders attacker-controlled editor content and a user interacts with the element, the retained handler can execute script in the application's browser origin, enabling stored cross-site scripting, data exposure, or unauthorized browser-context actions. This issue is fixed in version 2.47.11.
— MITRE
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/suneditorto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 2.47.11 - Upgrade
Upgrade
SunEditorto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 2.47.11 - Compensating control
Update the sanitizer to explicitly reject or unwrap unknown, custom, and namespaced HTML elements; normalize DOM elements before sanitization; re-validate sanitized output after browser DOM parsing; and strip all event-handler attributes, including from unknown or custom elements.
- Compensating control
Add regression tests covering namespaced and custom-tag payloads.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are exposed to this issue?
Applications using SunEditor versions before 2.47.11 are exposed if they render attacker-controlled editor content. The impact occurs in the browser origin of the application rendering that content.
What must an attacker do to exploit the vulnerability?
An attacker must cause crafted content containing namespaced or custom HTML elements with retained event-handler attributes to be stored or otherwise rendered by the application. A user must then interact with the crafted element for the handler to execute.
Are users affected merely by viewing malicious editor content?
The available information specifies that script execution occurs when a user interacts with the crafted element. It does not state that passive viewing alone triggers execution.
What version resolves the issue?
Upgrade SunEditor to version 2.47.11, which fixes the inconsistent sanitizer handling of namespaced and custom HTML elements.