CVE-2026-59185: High severity go/github.com/identrail/identrail vulnerability
Summary
identrail's GitHub App connection-completion endpoint binds a fully client-supplied installationid to the caller's workspace without verifying that the installation belongs to, or was installed by, the workspace that initiated the connect flow. identrail then mints a GitHub App installation access token for the supplied installationid using the app's own JWT, so an authenticated tenant can link any other identrail customer's GitHub App installation into their own workspace and read that victim organization's private repositories.
Affected code (default-on path, no feature flag)
- Route: internal/api/router.go:3590 — POST /v1/workspaces/:workspaceid/projects/:projectid/github/connect/complete. installationid is read from the JSON body or the attacker-controlled X-GitHub-Installation-ID header (router.go:3582-3588). - Service: internal/api/githubconnect.go:781 CompleteGitHubConnection. The state token IS rigorously bound to the caller's scope (githubconnect.go:818: if stateRecord.TenantID != scope.TenantID || stateRecord.WorkspaceID != project.WorkspaceID || stateRecord.ProjectID != project.ProjectID { ... }), but the only check on installationid is request.InstallationID <= 0 (:794). The raw client value is persisted as the workspace's connection (:840). - Cross-tenant read primitive: internal/connectors/github/repositories.go:39 ListInstallationRepositories → internal/connectors/github/app.go:170 mints a token via POST /app/installations/{installationId}/accesstokens signed with the App JWT, succeeding for any installation where identrail's app is installed.
The feature-flagged V2 path CompleteGitHubConnector (githubconnect.go:447, default off) shares the gap and is additionally weaker (matches pending connector by state value alone with no caller-scope re-check); a single fix should cover both.
Intent proof
The code binds state to {TenantID, WorkspaceID, ProjectID} and re-verifies it at completion (:818), demonstrating it understands binding is required. The asymmetry — state bound, installationid unbound — is the missed check.
Exploitation
1. Attacker is any authenticated identrail tenant; they call StartGitHubConnection for their own workspace and receive a state. 2. Attacker calls the completion route with {state: <their state>, installationid: V} where V is a victim org's identrail GitHub App installation id (installation ids are not secret — they appear in post-install redirect URLs, webhook payloads, the org's GitHub App settings, and are enumerable integers). 3. CompleteGitHubConnection accepts (state matches attacker scope), ListInstallationRepositories(V) mints a token for V and lists the victim org's private repos, and the connection is persisted under the attacker's workspace. 4. Attacker now reads the victim org's private repository inventory and can drive posture scans/repo reads via their own workspace.
Impact: cross-tenant disclosure of another customer organization's private GitHub repositories and metadata.
Remediation
Bind installationid with the same rigor as state: capture it from GitHub's signed post-install redirect (setupurl/callbackurl) and pin it to the pending state at start time, and/or after minting verify the installation's account matches the org the initiating workspace is authorized for.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
go/github.com/identrail/identrailto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.0.2
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Is this reachable in a default deployment?
Yes. The affected connection-completion route is described as a default-on path with no feature flag.
What does an attacker need to exploit it?
The attacker needs to be an authenticated identrail tenant and to complete a GitHub connection flow for their own workspace. They can then supply another customer's GitHub App installation ID, either in the JSON request body or the X-GitHub-Installation-ID header.
Does the connection state token prevent cross-tenant exploitation?
No. The state token is checked against the caller's tenant, workspace, and project, but the installation ID is not verified as belonging to the workspace that initiated the flow.
What access can a successful attacker obtain?
Identrail mints a GitHub App installation access token for the supplied installation ID using its own JWT. This can allow the attacker to link a victim customer's installation to their workspace and read that victim organization's private repositories.