CVE-2026-61572: AVideo-Encoder: unauthenticated full-response server-side request forgery
AVideo is a video-sharing Platform. Before the initial remediation attempt in 8.1.0, urlgetcontents in objects/functions.php accepts caller-controlled destinations after only FILTERVALIDATEURL syntax validation, without rejecting private, loopback, or link-local addresses, and disables TLS peer verification. Login::isLogged reauthenticates using the attacker-settable encoderaVideoURL cookie together with arbitrary nonempty encoderuser and encoderpass cookies, and Login::run stores the raw fetched body in result. The unauthenticated objects/login.json.php endpoint returns that session object, enabling full-response exfiltration through a supplied siteURL; its Streamer::isURLAllowed gate allows all sites when the operator allowlist is empty, the default. An unauthenticated remote attacker can read internal HTTP and HTTPS responses, including cloud instance-metadata credentials, and reach internal TCP services. A further pre-authentication FTP variant in view/youtubeDl.json.php routes an ftp videoURL into FTPDownloader; parseFtpUrl in objects/FTPDownloader.php accepts its host and port for ftpconnect. This also enables requests to internal FTP services. Untrusted self-signed HTTPS certificates are accepted, and no account or operator interaction is required. Version 8.1.0 contains an initial remediation attempt that removes raw-response reflection and adds destination checks, but private-network exemptions and login TLS-verification defaults leave complete remediation of the described internal-network and TLS variants unresolved.
Affected Software
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Are default deployments exposed?
Yes. The `Streamer::isURLAllowed` gate permits all sites when the operator allowlist is empty, which is the default configuration.
What does an attacker need to exploit this?
The HTTP/HTTPS path is remotely exploitable without authentication, privileges, or user interaction. An attacker supplies a destination through `siteURL` and can set the `encoder_aVideoURL`, `encoder_user`, and `encoder_pass` cookies used by the login flow.
What could an attacker access?
An attacker can retrieve full HTTP and HTTPS responses from internal, loopback, private, or link-local destinations, including cloud instance-metadata credentials. The FTP path can also connect to attacker-selected internal hosts and ports, allowing access to internal TCP services.
How can exposure be reduced before patching?
Configure a restrictive operator allowlist rather than leaving it empty. Network egress controls that prevent the encoder from reaching internal, loopback, link-local, and cloud metadata addresses can further limit SSRF reach.
Which releases are affected?
The issue affects versions before the initial remediation attempt in 8.1.0. The provided release reference identifies v8.1.0 as the remediation release.