CVE-2026-61794: Capsule: Malformed ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex can bypass Tenant validation and trigger namespace admission panic
Summary A validation bug in internal/webhook/tenant/validation/forbiddenannotationsregex.go allows an invalid ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex value to bypass Tenant admission on update. The webhook compiles ForbiddenLabels.Regex for both labels and annotations, so a malformed annotations regex can be persisted. Once stored, namespace admission later evaluates the bad regex through pkg/api/forbiddenlist.go, where regexp.MustCompile can panic and cause admission failure.
Details In internal/webhook/tenant/validation/forbiddenannotationsregex.go, OnUpdate validates the new Tenant object, but the loop compiles tnt.Spec.NamespaceOptions.ForbiddenLabels.Regex for both labels and annotations. That means an invalid ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex is never validated if ForbiddenLabels.Regex is valid.
Relevant paths: - internal/webhook/tenant/validation/forbiddenannotationsregex.go - internal/webhook/namespace/validation/usermetadata.go - pkg/api/forbiddenlist.go
Namespace admission later calls api.ValidateForbidden(...), and ForbiddenListSpec.RegexMatch() uses regexp.MustCompile(in.Regex). If the malformed regex is present in the Tenant spec, any namespace request that reaches this check can panic or fail hard, causing denial of service for namespace operations in the affected tenant.
PoC 1. Update a Tenant so that: - spec.namespaceOptions.forbiddenLabels.regex is valid - spec.namespaceOptions.forbiddenAnnotations.regex is malformed, for example: [invalid-regex( 2. The Tenant update is accepted because the webhook compiles the labels regex for both fields. 3. Create or update a Namespace that triggers forbidden metadata validation. 4. The namespace admission path reaches regexp.MustCompile(...) and panics.
package main
import ( "fmt" "regexp" )
type ForbiddenListSpec struct { Regex string }
type NamespaceOptions struct { ForbiddenLabels ForbiddenListSpec ForbiddenAnnotations ForbiddenListSpec }
type Tenant struct { NamespaceOptions NamespaceOptions }
func validateTenantUpdate(tnt Tenant) error { if tnt.NamespaceOptions == nil { return nil }
annotationsToCheck := map[string]string{ "labels": tnt.NamespaceOptions.ForbiddenLabels.Regex, "annotations": tnt.NamespaceOptions.ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex, }
for scope, annotation := range annotationsToCheck { if , err := regexp.Compile(tnt.NamespaceOptions.ForbiddenLabels.Regex); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("deny update: unable to compile %s regex for forbidden %s", annotation, scope) } }
return nil }
func validateForbidden(metadata map[string]string, forbidden ForbiddenListSpec) error { for key := range metadata { if forbidden.Regex != "" { if regexp.MustCompile(forbidden.Regex).MatchString(key) { return fmt.Errorf("forbidden key matched: %s", key) } } }
return nil }
func main() { oldTenant := &Tenant{ NamespaceOptions: &NamespaceOptions{ ForbiddenLabels: ForbiddenListSpec{Regex: ^[a-z0-9-]+$}, ForbiddenAnnotations: ForbiddenListSpec{Regex: ^[a-z0-9-]+$}, }, }
newTenant := &Tenant{ NamespaceOptions: &NamespaceOptions{ ForbiddenLabels: ForbiddenListSpec{Regex: ^[a-z0-9-]+$}, ForbiddenAnnotations: ForbiddenListSpec{Regex: [invalid-regex(}, }, }
fmt.Println("=== Update step ===") if err := validateTenantUpdate(newTenant); err != nil { fmt.Printf("unexpected deny: %v\n", err) } else { fmt.Println("allowed: malformed ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex bypassed validation") }
fmt.Println() fmt.Println("=== Namespace step ===") = oldTenant
defer func() { if r := recover(); r != nil { fmt.Printf("panic reproduced from ValidateForbidden: %v\n", r) } }()
= validateForbidden(map[string]string{"example": "value"}, ForbiddenListSpec{Regex: [invalid-regex(}) fmt.Println("no panic, unexpected") } Expected output:
text === Update step === allowed: malformed ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex bypassed validation
=== Namespace step === panic reproduced from ValidateForbidden: regexp: Compile([invalid-regex(): error parsing regexp: missing closing ]: [invalid-regex(
Impact An attacker who can update the Tenant configuration can persist a malformed ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex and cause namespace admission failures for the affected tenant. This can result in a tenant-scoped denial of service.
Other sources
Capsule is a multi-tenancy and policy-based framework for Kubernetes. From 0.13.0 until 0.13.7, the Tenant update validation in internal/webhook/tenant/validation/forbiddenannotationsregex.go compiles ForbiddenLabels.Regex for both the labels and annotations checks instead of validating ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex. An administrator who can update a Tenant can therefore persist a malformed ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex while leaving the labels expression valid. Namespace creation or update later passes the stored expression through pkg/api/forbiddenlist.go, where regexp.MustCompile can panic during forbidden metadata validation and deny namespace operations for the affected tenant. This issue is fixed in version 0.13.7.
— MITRE
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
go/github.com/projectcapsule/capsuleto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.13.7 - Upgrade
Upgrade to a fixed release to a version that resolves this vulnerability.
Fixed in 0.13.7 - Configuration
Update Tenant spec so spec.namespaceOptions.forbiddenAnnotations.regex is a valid regex string (avoid malformed values such as `[invalid-regex(`), since malformed ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex can bypass validation when ForbiddenLabels.Regex is valid.
Capsule NamespaceOptions validation spec.namespaceOptions.forbiddenAnnotations.regex = a syntactically valid regular expression
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who can trigger this issue, and who is affected by the resulting outage?
An administrator who can update a Tenant must first save a malformed ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex while keeping ForbiddenLabels.Regex valid. Namespace creation or updates for the affected tenant can then panic during forbidden metadata validation, denying those namespace operations.
Are default deployments affected?
The issue requires a Tenant update containing a malformed ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex, so it is not triggered solely by running an affected Capsule version. Deployments are exposed if an administrator can persist such a Tenant configuration.
What should be done if an immediate upgrade is not possible?
Review Tenant resources for malformed ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex values and correct or remove any invalid expressions. Restrict Tenant update permissions to trusted administrators until the fixed version can be deployed.
Which versions are affected and which version fixes the issue?
Capsule versions from 0.13.0 until 0.13.7 are affected. The issue is fixed in version 0.13.7.