CVE-2026-62251: Homer: Authenticated SQL Injection via Unvalidated rawquery Field in /api/v4/statistics/query

Published Oct 7, 2026
·
Updated

Summary The V4StatisticsQuery handler passes the user-supplied rawquery field directly to DuckDB without calling the sqlvalidator.ValidateRawSQL function used throughout the rest of the codebase. Any authenticated user can execute arbitrary SQL statements against all data accessible through the FlightSQL service.

Details coordinator/handlers/statisticsv4.go lines 74-107 — V4StatisticsQuery: go query := &model.V4StatisticsQuery{} if err = c.Bind(query); err != nil { ... } // No ValidateRawSQL call here — contrast with other handlers: results, err := h.flightService.Query(c.Request().Context(), query.RawQuery)

Contrast with coordinator/handlers/search.go line 194 — secure pattern not followed: go if err := sqlvalidator.ValidateRawSQL(rawQuery); err != nil { return c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, ...) }

query.RawQuery is whatever the caller submitted; it is passed verbatim to the FlightSQL/DuckDB backend. The handler is registered under the protected group (requires JWT), but given that the default JWT secret is empty (see related advisory), this is effectively pre-authentication on a default deployment.

PoC bash With a valid JWT (or empty JWT secret bypass): curl -s -X POST http://<homer-host>/api/v4/statistics/query \ -H "Authorization: Bearer <jwt>" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "param": { "query": [{"rawquery": "SELECT FROM informationschema.tables"}] } }' Returns all table names accessible to the DuckDB FlightSQL service

Exfiltrate all stored call records: "rawquery": "SELECT FROM hep LIMIT 1000" Arbitrary DuckDB SQL is accepted including INSTALL/LOAD for extension-based exfiltration

Impact SQL Injection / Improper Neutralization of Special Elements (CWE-89). Any authenticated user can execute arbitrary SQL against all data accessible to the FlightSQL/DuckDB backend — including all stored VoIP call records, SIP messages, and metadata. Combined with the authentication bypass when JWT secret is empty, this is exploitable without credentials.

Fix Apply sqlvalidator.ValidateRawSQL() to query.RawQuery before passing it to h.flightService.Query(), matching the pattern already used in search.go and transactionsv4.go.

If possible, please apply for a CVE number when posting.

Other sources

Homer is open source telecom observability software. Prior to version 11.0.283, the V4StatisticsQuery handler passes the user-supplied rawquery field directly to DuckDB without calling the sqlvalidator.ValidateRawSQL function used throughout the rest of the codebase. Any authenticated user can execute arbitrary SQL statements against all data accessible through the FlightSQL service. Version 11.0.283 patches the issue.

— MITRE

Affected Software

1 affected componentFixes available
go/github.com/sipcapture/homer-app<0.0.0-20260625085520-a7d027dc684b
0.0.0-20260625085520-a7d027dc684b

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade go/github.com/sipcapture/homer-app to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 0.0.0-20260625085520-a7d027dc684b
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade Homer to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 11.0.283

Event History

Oct 7, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·04:09 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·04:09 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Advisory Published
via GitHub·04:13 PM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·04:13 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software
Data Sourced
via NVD·05:16 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Is authentication required to reach the affected endpoint?

The handler is under the protected group and normally requires a JWT. However, the provided data states that the default JWT secret is empty, making exploitation effectively pre-authentication on a default deployment.

2

What data can an attacker access or modify?

An attacker can execute arbitrary SQL statements against all data accessible through the FlightSQL service. The stated impact includes high confidentiality and integrity impact, with no availability impact indicated.

3

What does an attacker need to exploit this issue?

The attacker needs to submit a user-controlled rawquery value to the V4StatisticsQuery handler. The query is passed verbatim to the FlightSQL/DuckDB backend without the SQL validation used by other handlers.

Contact

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