CVE-2026-62662: Pocket ID: Client credentials grant allows any OIDC client to obtain tokens for arbitrary audiences

Published Nov 4, 2026
·
Updated

Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to services. From 1.11.0 until 2.10.0, createTokenFromClientCredentials in backend/internal/service/oidcservice.go accepts the client-controlled resource parameter and embeds it directly in the access token aud claim without validating that the audience is registered or that the requesting client may access it. Any authenticated OIDC client can therefore obtain a Pocket ID-signed token naming another client or an arbitrary audience. The /api/oidc/introspect endpoint cannot distinguish the unauthorized token because it treats a token as active when the introspecting client's identifier matches the attacker-selected audience. In deployments where resource servers trust Pocket ID access tokens for service-to-service authorization, this bypasses audience-based access controls and can permit unauthorized data access or actions; deployments that do not use these tokens for resource-server authorization have no immediate exploitable impact. This issue is fixed in version 2.10.0.

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade Pocket ID to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.10.0

Event History

Nov 4, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·10:29 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·10:29 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·11:17 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which deployments are practically exposed to this issue?

Deployments are exposed when resource servers use Pocket ID access tokens for service-to-service authorization and rely on audience-based access controls. Deployments that do not use these tokens for resource-server authorization have no immediate exploitable impact.

2

What does an attacker need to exploit it?

An attacker needs credentials for any authenticated OIDC client. They can then request a client-credentials token with a resource value naming another client or an arbitrary audience.

3

Why does token introspection not prevent the bypass?

The introspection endpoint treats a token as active when the introspecting client's identifier matches the audience selected by the attacker. It therefore cannot distinguish an unauthorized token whose audience was set through the client-controlled resource parameter.

4

What version resolves the issue?

Upgrade to Pocket ID version 2.10.0. The affected range is from 1.11.0 until 2.10.0.

Contact

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