CVE-2026-63325: Redocly CLI: Arbitrary code execution via Arazzo `$faker` expression using `respect`
Redocly CLI makes OpenAPI validation, linting, and documentation workflows easier. Prior to version 2.33.0 of @redocly/respect-core and @redocly/cli, the respect command dynamically evaluates $faker runtime expressions in Arazzo descriptions. A crafted expression can traverse constructor, prototype, or proto properties in packages/respect-core/src/modules/context-parser/get-value-from-context.ts, reach the JavaScript Function constructor, and execute arbitrary code when a user processes an untrusted description. The executed code runs with the privileges of the CLI process and can execute shell commands or read CI secrets. Users processing only trusted, self-authored workflows are not affected. This issue is fixed in @redocly/respect-core and @redocly/cli version 2.33.0.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
@redocly/respect-coreto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 2.33.0 - Upgrade
Upgrade
@redocly/clito a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 2.33.0
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who is exposed to this issue?
Users of @redocly/respect-core or @redocly/cli before version 2.33.0 are exposed when they run the respect command against an untrusted Arazzo description. Users who process only trusted, self-authored workflows are not affected.
What does an attacker need to exploit it?
An attacker needs to cause a user or CI job to process a crafted Arazzo description containing a malicious $faker runtime expression with the respect command. Exploitation requires user interaction, but no privileges are required by the attacker.
What is the impact if exploitation succeeds?
The crafted expression can execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the CLI process. This can include running shell commands or reading secrets available to a CI environment.
What should teams do if they cannot immediately upgrade?
Do not run the respect command on untrusted Arazzo descriptions. Limit processing to trusted, self-authored workflows and avoid exposing CI secrets to jobs that may process externally supplied descriptions.
Which versions contain the fix?
The issue is fixed in @redocly/respect-core and @redocly/cli version 2.33.0.