CVE-2026-64127: Bluetooth: L2CAP: ecred_reconfigure: send packed pdu, not stack pointer

Published Jul 19, 2026
·
Updated

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: L2CAP: ecredreconfigure: send packed pdu, not stack pointer

Commit 1c08108f3014 ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Avoid -Wflex-array-member-not-at-end warnings") converted the on-stack request PDU in l2capecredreconfigure() from an explicit packed struct to DEFINERAWFLEX(), but did not adjust the size and source-pointer arguments to l2capsendcmd():

- struct { - struct l2capecredreconfreq req; - le16 scid; - } pdu; + DEFINERAWFLEX(struct l2capecredreconfreq, pdu, scid, 1); ... l2capsendcmd(conn, chan->ident, L2CAPECREDRECONFREQ, sizeof(pdu), &pdu);

After the conversion, DEFINERAWFLEX() expands to declare an anonymous union pduu plus a local pointer "pdu" pointing at it. Therefore:

- sizeof(pdu) is now sizeof(struct l2capecredreconfreq ) = 8 on 64-bit (4 on 32-bit), not the 6 bytes of (mtu, mps, scid[1]). - &pdu is the address of the local pointer's stack storage, not the address of the request payload.

l2capsendcmd() forwards (data, count) to l2capbuildcmd(), which calls skbputdata(skb, data, count). The L2CAPECREDRECONFIGUREREQ packet body therefore contains 8 bytes copied from the kernel stack starting at &pdu -- the 8 bytes overlap the pdu pointer's value, leaking a kernel stack address to the paired Bluetooth peer. The intended (mtu, mps, scid) fields are not transmitted at all, so the peer rejects the request as malformed and the L2CAPECREDRECONFIGURE feature itself has been broken for the local-side initiator since the introducing commit landed.

The sibling site l2capecredconnreq() in the same commit was converted correctly (sizeof(pdu) + len, pdu); only this site was missed.

Restore the original semantics: pass the full flex-struct size via structsize(pdu, scid, 1) and the pdu pointer (the struct address) as the source.

Validated on a stock 7.0-based host kernel via the real call path: setsockopt(SOLBLUETOOTH, BTRCVMTU, ...) on a BTCONNECTED L2CAPMODEEXTFLOWCTL socket emits an L2CAPECREDRECONFIGUREREQ whose body is 8 bytes (the on-stack pdu local's value) rather than the expected 6. Three captures from fresh socket / fresh hciemu peer on the same host -- low bytes vary per call, high 0xffff confirms a kernel virtual address (KASLR-randomised stack slot, not a fixed string):

RECONFREQ body (ident=0x02 len=8): 42 fb 54 af 0e ca ff ff RECONFREQ body (ident=0x02 len=8): 52 3d 2e af 0e ca ff ff RECONFREQ body (ident=0x02 len=8): b2 fc 5b af 0e ca ff ff

After this patch the body is 6 bytes carrying the expected little-endian (mtu, mps, scid).

Affected Software

8 affected components
Linux Linux kernel
Linux Linux kernel>=6.10<6.12.92
Linux Linux kernel>=6.13<6.18.34
Linux Linux kernel>=6.19<7.0.11
Linux Linux kernel=7.1-rc1
Linux Linux kernel=7.1-rc2
Linux Linux kernel=7.1-rc3
Linux Linux kernel=7.1-rc4

Event History

Jul 19, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·03:40 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·03:40 PM
Description
Data Sourced
via NVD·04:17 PM
RemedyDescriptionSeverityAffected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

What is the severity of CVE-2026-64127?

The severity of CVE-2026-64127 is rated at risk level 33.

2

How do I fix CVE-2026-64127?

To fix CVE-2026-64127, update to the latest version of the Linux kernel that includes the patch for this vulnerability.

3

What impact does CVE-2026-64127 have on systems using the Linux kernel?

CVE-2026-64127 may potentially allow for improper handling of Bluetooth L2CAP requests, leading to security risks.

4

What components of the Linux kernel are affected by CVE-2026-64127?

CVE-2026-64127 specifically affects the Bluetooth L2CAP functionality within the Linux kernel.

5

When was CVE-2026-64127 published?

CVE-2026-64127 was published on July 19, 2026.

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