CVE-2026-67219: RabbitMQ: Consistent-hash exchange unbounded weight
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, addbinding/3 parses the routing key as an integer weight N and computes ring positions with lists:seq(NextN0, NextN0 + N - 1). validatebinding/2 only checks N >= 1 , no upper bound. The resulting list is stored in the exchange's Khepri record, replicated cluster-wide, and reloaded on restart. A user with write permission on a consistent-hash exchange and read on a queue can create a binding whose routing key (the hash-ring weight) is an arbitrarily large integer. The broker allocates a list of that many integers via lists:seq/2 and persists it to Khepri across all cluster nodes , a single binding with weight 100000000 allocates ~800 MB on every node and survives restarts. Preconditions include rabbitmqconsistenthashexchange plugin enabled write permission on a consistent-hash exchange + read on a queue (standard binding perms). This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
RabbitMQto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 3.13.15 - Upgrade
Upgrade
RabbitMQto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 4.0.20 - Upgrade
Upgrade
RabbitMQto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 4.1.11 - Upgrade
Upgrade
RabbitMQto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 4.2.6 - Upgrade
Upgrade
RabbitMQto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 4.3.0
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are exposed to this issue?
Deployments are exposed when they run a version earlier than 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, or 4.3.0 and have the rabbitmq_consistent_hash_exchange plugin enabled. The affected exchange must be a consistent-hash exchange to which a user can create bindings.
What access does an attacker need?
An attacker needs write permission on a consistent-hash exchange and read permission on a queue, which are the standard permissions required to create a binding. No additional privilege is described.
What is the practical impact in a cluster?
A malicious binding can specify an arbitrarily large weight, causing the broker to allocate a correspondingly large integer list. The list is persisted in Khepri, replicated to every cluster node, and reloaded after restart; for example, a weight of 100000000 consumes about 800 MB on each node.
How can exposure be reduced before upgrading?
Disable the rabbitmq_consistent_hash_exchange plugin where it is not needed, or restrict write access to consistent-hash exchanges and read access to queues so untrusted users cannot create bindings. Upgrading to the fixed release for the relevant release line removes the unbounded weight condition.