CVE-2026-67219: RabbitMQ: Consistent-hash exchange unbounded weight

Published Sep 23, 2026
·
Updated

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, addbinding/3 parses the routing key as an integer weight N and computes ring positions with lists:seq(NextN0, NextN0 + N - 1). validatebinding/2 only checks N >= 1 , no upper bound. The resulting list is stored in the exchange's Khepri record, replicated cluster-wide, and reloaded on restart. A user with write permission on a consistent-hash exchange and read on a queue can create a binding whose routing key (the hash-ring weight) is an arbitrarily large integer. The broker allocates a list of that many integers via lists:seq/2 and persists it to Khepri across all cluster nodes , a single binding with weight 100000000 allocates ~800 MB on every node and survives restarts. Preconditions include rabbitmqconsistenthashexchange plugin enabled write permission on a consistent-hash exchange + read on a queue (standard binding perms). This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0.

Affected Software

1 affected component
RabbitMQ RabbitMQ<3.13.15, <4.0.20, <4.1.11, <4.2.6, <4.3.0

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade RabbitMQ to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 3.13.15
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade RabbitMQ to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 4.0.20
  3. Upgrade

    Upgrade RabbitMQ to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 4.1.11
  4. Upgrade

    Upgrade RabbitMQ to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 4.2.6
  5. Upgrade

    Upgrade RabbitMQ to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 4.3.0

Event History

Sep 23, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·08:38 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·08:38 PM
DescriptionWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·09:17 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which deployments are exposed to this issue?

Deployments are exposed when they run a version earlier than 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, or 4.3.0 and have the rabbitmq_consistent_hash_exchange plugin enabled. The affected exchange must be a consistent-hash exchange to which a user can create bindings.

2

What access does an attacker need?

An attacker needs write permission on a consistent-hash exchange and read permission on a queue, which are the standard permissions required to create a binding. No additional privilege is described.

3

What is the practical impact in a cluster?

A malicious binding can specify an arbitrarily large weight, causing the broker to allocate a correspondingly large integer list. The list is persisted in Khepri, replicated to every cluster node, and reloaded after restart; for example, a weight of 100000000 consumes about 800 MB on each node.

4

How can exposure be reduced before upgrading?

Disable the rabbitmq_consistent_hash_exchange plugin where it is not needed, or restrict write access to consistent-hash exchanges and read access to queues so untrusted users cannot create bindings. Upgrading to the fixed release for the relevant release line removes the unbounded weight condition.

Contact

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