CVE-2026-67424: Flyto2 Core: Guarded HTTP modules follow redirects into internal space without per-hop SSRF revalidation

Published Jul 29, 2026
·
Updated

Summary The HTTP modules that DO call the SSRF guard (http.get, http.request, http.batch) validate only the initial URL, then issue the request with aiohttp's default allowredirects=True and perform no per-hop revalidation. An attacker hosts a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address; the guard passes on the public host and aiohttp transparently follows the redirect into internal space, returning the internal body.

Root Cause src/core/modules/atomic/http/get.py:116 calls session.get(url, ...) with no allowredirects argument → aiohttp default True. request.py:60 sets allowredirects=followredirects (default True at :327); batch.py:57 likewise. A repo grep of http/ for onrequestredirect / response.history returns NONE — there is no redirect interception or Location revalidation.

Impact Full readable SSRF that defeats the primary SSRF control on the very modules that correctly validate. Confidentiality of internal/metadata responses (C:H), S:C.

Proof of Concept Verified live: http.get with allowlisted base 127.0.0.1 followed a 302 Location: http://127.0.0.2/... (non-allowlisted) and returned INTERNAL-VIA-REDIRECT. attacker hosts http://attacker.tld/r -> 302 Location: http://<cloud-metadata-ip>/latest/meta-data/... executemodule http.get {"url":"http://attacker.tld/r"}

Attack Chain 1. Entry: executemodule http.get {url:"http://attacker.tld/r"} (attacker 302->internal). Guard: validateurlwithenvconfig(url) (get.py:104). Bypass proof: validation runs on attacker.tld (public) → passes; never re-run on the redirect target. 2. Sink: session.get(url) (get.py:116) — no allowredirects arg → aiohttp default True. Bypass proof: grep of http/ for onrequestredirect/response.history → NONE. 3. Impact: aiohttp follows 302 to the internal host; internal body returned (get.py:118).

Bypass Evidence Live PoC followed a 302 into non-allowlisted loopback and returned the internal marker string. aiohttp ClientSession.get default allowredirects=True; module never sets it False; no per-hop revalidation exists.

Affected Versions <= 2.26.6 — get.py:116, request.py:60, batch.py:57 present on latest release tag.

Suggested Fix Set allowredirects=False and manually revalidate each Location header through validateurlwithenvconfig before following, or cap and re-check every hop.

Credit

Vulnerability discovered by zx (Jace).

Other sources

Flyto2 Core is an execution kernel for automation and AI-agent workflows. Prior to 2.26.7, the HTTP modules http.get, http.request, and http.batch in src/core/modules/atomic/http/get.py, src/core/modules/atomic/http/request.py, and src/core/modules/atomic/http/batch.py validate only the initial URL, then follow redirects with allowredirects=True and without per-hop Location revalidation, allowing a public URL to redirect into internal address space and return the internal response body. This issue is fixed in version 2.26.7.

— MITRE

Affected Software

2 affected componentsFixes available
Flyto2 Flyto2 Core<2.26.7
pip/flyto-core<=2.26.6
2.26.7

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade pip/flyto-core to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.26.7
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade Flyto2 Core to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.26.7
  3. Configuration

    Set allow_redirects=False for aiohttp requests made by http.get, http.request, and http.batch (e.g., session.get(url, ...) / session.request ... / batch request path) so redirects are not followed automatically.

    aiohttp client request in Flyto2 Core HTTP modules (http.get / http.request / http.batch) allow_redirects = false
  4. Configuration

    When redirects are encountered, manually revalidate each redirect target by running validate_url_with_env_config on every Location header value before following the next hop (cap and re-check every hop).

    Flyto2 Core SSRF guard usage Location per-hop revalidation = validate_url_with_env_config(redirect_location) for each Location hop

Event History

Jul 29, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·06:32 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·06:32 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·07:16 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Jul 30, 2026
Advisory Published
via GitHub·02:48 PM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·02:48 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

What is the severity of CVE-2026-67424?

CVE-2026-67424 has a high severity score of 8.5.

2

What vulnerability does CVE-2026-67424 describe?

CVE-2026-67424 describes a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Flyto2 Core's HTTP modules.

3

How do I fix CVE-2026-67424?

To fix CVE-2026-67424, upgrade Flyto2 Core to version 2.26.7 or later.

4

What are the affected modules in CVE-2026-67424?

The affected modules in CVE-2026-67424 are http.get, http.request, and http.batch.

5

What could be the potential impact of CVE-2026-67424?

The potential impact of CVE-2026-67424 is unauthorized access to internal services due to improper URL validation.

Contact

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