CVE-2026-67428: Flyto2 Core: Multiple HTTP-family modules fetch client-controlled URLs without the SSRF guard their siblings apply (SSRF to internal/metadata)

Published Jul 29, 2026
·
Updated

Summary Numerous HTTP-emitting modules (core.api.httpget, core.api.httppost, graphql.query/graphql.mutation, monitor.httpcheck, communication.slacksend, notification.{discord,slack,teams}.sendmessage, ai.visionanalyze [anthropic path], verify.visualdiff, browser.proxyrotate, and the agent/llm inline baseurl branch) perform outbound requests to a fully client-controlled URL without calling the project's own SSRF guard (validateurlwithenvconfig) that their sibling modules apply. An authenticated workflow-author can point the URL at the cloud metadata IP (169.254.169.254), a loopback/RFC1918 host, or any internal host and read the response, yielding cloud-metadata credential theft and internal service read/write.

Root Cause The SSRF guard is per-module (there is NO global egress interception). Each module must call validateurlwithenvconfig before issuing a request. The listed modules never call it — they only carry an ssrfprotected metadata tag string which enforces nothing. Exemplar: src/core/modules/thirdparty/developer/http/requests.py — grepping for validateurl|ssrf|isprivate in requests.py returns 0 guard calls; session.get(url) fires at :85 (HTTPGetModule) and session.post at :188 (HTTPPostModule). SECURITY.md incorrectly lists api.httpget as SSRF-protected.

Impact Readable SSRF: full {statuscode, headers, body} returned to the caller (requests.py:96-108). Enables theft of cloud IAM credentials from the metadata endpoint and read/write access to internal-only APIs. Scope Changed (S:C) — the request crosses into cloud-metadata / internal-network authority the workflow layer does not otherwise have.

Proof of Concept Verified live this session: core.api.httpget with url pointed at a loopback internal server returned the internal body INTERNAL-SECRET-IAM-CREDENTIALS, while the guarded sibling http.get returned NETWORKERROR: Hostname blocked: 127.0.0.1 on the same input — proving the branch-asymmetry is real (not a port artifact). POST /mcp {"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"executemodule", "arguments":{"moduleid":"core.api.httpget", "params":{"url":"http://<cloud-metadata-ip>/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"}}}}

Attack Chain 1. Entry: authenticated MCP client → POST /mcp executemodule core.api.httpget, url set to the cloud metadata endpoint. Guard: requireauth (mcp.py:71). Bypass proof: passes with a valid workflow-author bearer token (PR:L). 2. Check: capability denylist / enforcemodulepolicy (base.py:240). Bypass proof: core.api. not in DEFAULTDENYLIST (modulepolicy.py:45-67) → isallowed=True (runtime-registration verified: core.api.httpget -> HTTPGetModule). 3. Check: SSRF validation. Bypass proof: requests.py has ZERO validateurl/ssrf calls — only the ssrfprotected tag string at :23/:116. session.get(url) fires at :85. 4. Sink: aiohttp GET/POST to the cloud metadata IP. 5. Impact: full response body returned → IAM credential theft, internal read/write.

Bypass Evidence Grepping validateurl|ssrf|isprivate in requests.py → 0 guard calls (2 hits are both the inert tag string). Live PoC returned internal body directly; guarded sibling blocked the same input. Direct IP works — no IPv6 transition trick needed (AC:L), unlike the seed CVE-2026-55787.

Affected Versions <= 2.26.6 — code present on latest release tag v2.26.6 (requests.py:19,112).

Suggested Fix Call validateurlwithenvconfig(url) in each listed module before issuing the outbound request, matching the guarded siblings (e.g. ai.model:157, http.get). Best: route all outbound HTTP through a single guarded client wrapper so new modules inherit the guard.

Credit

Vulnerability discovered by zx (Jace).

Other sources

Flyto2 Core is an execution kernel for automation and AI-agent workflows. Prior to 2.26.7, HTTP-emitting modules including src/core/modules/thirdparty/developer/http/requests.py, core.api.httpget, core.api.httppost, graphql.query, graphql.mutation, monitor.httpcheck, communication.slacksend, notification.discord.sendmessage, notification.slack.sendmessage, notification.teams.sendmessage, ai.visionanalyze, verify.visualdiff, browser.proxyrotate, and the agent and llm inline baseurl branch fetch caller-controlled URLs without validateurlwithenvconfig, allowing SSRF to internal or metadata endpoints. This issue is fixed in version 2.26.7.

— MITRE

Affected Software

2 affected componentsFixes available
Flyto2 Flyto2 Core<2.26.7
pip/flyto-core<=2.26.6
2.26.7

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade pip/flyto-core to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.26.7
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade Flyto2 Core to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.26.7
  3. Configuration

    Ensure each listed module calls validate_url_with_env_config(url) immediately before any outbound request it issues (e.g., before aiohttp/session.get and session.post) rather than relying on the inert ssrf_protected tag string; this eliminates the module-to-module SSRF branch asymmetry where siblings applying validate_url_with_env_config were blocked while core.api.* / requests.py were not.

    Flyto2 Core HTTP-emitting modules (e.g., src/core/modules/third_party/developer/http/requests.py, core.api.http_get, core.api.http_post, graphql.query, graphql.mutation, monitor.http_check, communication.slack_send, notification.discord.send_message, notification.slack.send_message, notification.teams.send_message, ai.vision_analyze, verify.visual_diff, browser.proxy_rotate, and the agent/llm inline base_url branch) SSRF guard = validate_url_with_env_config(url)

Event History

Jul 29, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·06:48 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·06:48 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·07:16 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Jul 30, 2026
Advisory Published
via GitHub·02:48 PM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·02:48 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

What is the severity of CVE-2026-67428?

CVE-2026-67428 has a severity rating of high, scored at 8.5 according to the CVSS.

2

How do I fix CVE-2026-67428?

To fix CVE-2026-67428, upgrade Flyto2 Core to version 2.26.7 or later.

3

What types of vulnerabilities does CVE-2026-67428 expose?

CVE-2026-67428 exposes server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities through multiple HTTP-family modules.

4

What impact does CVE-2026-67428 have on my system?

The impact of CVE-2026-67428 may include unauthorized access to internal services and metadata.

5

Which versions of Flyto2 Core are affected by CVE-2026-67428?

Flyto2 Core versions prior to 2.26.7 are affected by CVE-2026-67428.

Contact

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