CVE-2026-69664: httpd parks a request worker indefinitely on a malformed chunk size sent after the headers
Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime vulnerability in Erlang/OTP inets httpd allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause denial of service by sending a request with a chunked body whose chunk-size line is not a hexadecimal number. The worker serving the connection is never released and no timeout reclaims it, so repeating the request across connections occupies every available worker and denies service to legitimate clients. No authentication is required and the default configuration is affected.
The chunk-size line must arrive in a write separate from the headers. When the body accompanies the headers, httpdrequesthandler:handlebody/3 calls httpchunk:decode/3 inside a try ... catch throw:Error, so the {error, {chunksize, }} thrown by httpchunk:decodesize/4 is answered with 400 Bad Request. When the chunk size arrives later, the decoder is resumed through a bare catch in httpdrequesthandler:handleinfo/2, which converts the throw into a return value rather than raising it; the resulting error tuple is then treated as the next decoder continuation, the socket is re-armed, and the worker waits for data that never comes. The request timeout has already been cancelled at the point the headers were accepted, and the periodic byte-rate check is only armed when minimumbytespersecond is configured, which it is not by default.
This issue affects OTP from OTP 18.1.4 before OTP 27.3.4.17, from OTP 28.0 before OTP 28.5.0.6, and from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.0.6, corresponding to inets from 6.0.3 before 9.3.2.7, from 9.4 before 9.6.2.3, and from 9.7 before 9.7.2.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
Erlang/OTP inets httpdto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 27.3.4.17 - Upgrade
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Erlang/OTP inets httpdto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 28.5.0.6 - Upgrade
Upgrade
Erlang/OTP inets httpdto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 29.0.6 - Upgrade
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inetsto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 9.3.2.7 - Upgrade
Upgrade
inetsto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 9.6.2.3 - Upgrade
Upgrade
inetsto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 9.7.2 - Compensating control
Ensure the chunk-size line must arrive in a write separate from the headers (i.e., send chunk-size line separately from request headers) to avoid triggering the malformed chunk-size handling path described for inets httpd.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Are deployments using the default httpd configuration exposed?
Yes. The default configuration is affected, and exploitation does not require authentication.
What request delivery pattern is required to trigger the worker leak?
The attacker must send a chunked request body with a non-hexadecimal chunk-size line, with that line delivered in a separate write after the headers. If the body arrives together with the headers, the server instead responds with 400 Bad Request.
How can this become a service-wide outage?
Each triggering connection leaves its serving worker waiting indefinitely, with no timeout reclaiming it. Repeating the request across connections can occupy all available workers and prevent legitimate clients from being served.
Why might a malformed chunked request not reproduce the issue in a simple single-write test?
When the malformed chunk-size line accompanies the headers, the decoder error is caught and handled as a 400 Bad Request. The vulnerable path occurs only when decoding is resumed after the headers have already been processed.