CVE-2026-71184: Gitea fork workflow approval bypass through review events
Gitea's pull request review notifier does not attach the pull request to the Actions notification, so the fork workflow approval gate does not recognize the run as originating from a fork. Review comment and review approval or rejection events can consequently load workflow code from the fork head and run it on the base repository's runners without the required maintainer approval. This allows execution of fork-controlled workflow code across the intended approval boundary.
Affected Software
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who is exposed to this issue?
Repositories that use Gitea Actions and accept pull requests from forks are exposed when review comment, review approval, or review rejection events can trigger workflows. The affected path can run workflow code from the fork head on runners belonging to the base repository.
What does an attacker need to exploit it?
An attacker needs to control a fork and cause a review comment or a review approval or rejection event that triggers a workflow. The workflow code loaded from the fork head is then executed without the intended maintainer approval gate.
Does the fork workflow approval gate protect these review-triggered runs?
No. For the affected review events, the Actions notification does not include the pull request association, so the approval gate does not identify the run as fork-originated.
What can be done if patching is not immediately possible?
Avoid or disable workflows triggered by review comments and review approval or rejection events for pull requests from forks. Restricting fork pull requests or preventing them from reaching runners used by the base repository also reduces exposure.