CVE-2026-71425: Outstatic: Authenticated GitHub REST proxy can send OAuth token to non-GitHub origins
Impact Outstatic’s authenticated GitHub REST proxy accepted an unvalidated endpoint parameter and constructed an upstream GitHub API URL by string concatenation while attaching the authenticated user’s GitHub OAuth token.
A user with access to the Outstatic dashboard could craft a request that caused the server to send their own GitHub OAuth token to a non-GitHub host. If that token was captured, it could be used to access GitHub resources available to that same user, including private repositories depending on granted scopes.
This does not allow unauthenticated attackers to access private repository data, and it does not directly expose another user’s GitHub token without an additional same-origin execution or request-forging primitive.
Patches The issue has been patched by validating that proxied requests resolve to the exact https://api.github.com/ origin and by restricting forwarded request headers.
Users should upgrade to v2.2.1 or later.
Workarounds If upgrading immediately is not possible, restrict access to /api/outstatic/github to trusted dashboard users only, or temporarily disable the endpoint if it is not needed.
As a temporary code-level mitigation, reject body-provided endpoint values that do not begin with /, verify the parsed URL origin is exactly https://api.github.com/, and block forwarding of sensitive headers such as Authorization, Host, and User-Agent.
Users who suspect their token was exposed should revoke the affected GitHub OAuth authorization and sign in again.
Other sources
Outstatic is a static site CMS for Markdown and MDX content stored in GitHub repositories. Prior to 2.2.1, the authenticated GitHub REST proxy accepts an unvalidated endpoint value, constructs an upstream URL by string concatenation, and attaches the current dashboard user's GitHub OAuth token without ensuring the destination remains the exact GitHub API origin. An authenticated dashboard user can cause the server to send that user's token to a non-GitHub host, potentially exposing private repositories and other resources allowed by the token's scopes. The issue does not let an unauthenticated attacker access private data and does not directly expose another user's token without an additional same-origin execution or request-forging primitive. This issue is fixed in version 2.2.1.
— MITRE
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/outstaticto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 2.2.1 - Upgrade
Upgrade to a fixed release to a version that resolves this vulnerability.
Fixed in 2.2.1 - Compensating control
As a temporary code-level mitigation, reject body-provided endpoint values that do not begin with /, verify the parsed URL origin is exactly https://api.github.com/, and block forwarding of Authorization, Host, and User-Agent headers.
- Compensating control
If upgrading immediately is not possible, restrict access to /api/outstatic/github to trusted dashboard users only, or temporarily disable the endpoint if it is not needed.
- Operational
If you suspect the GitHub OAuth token was exposed, revoke the affected GitHub OAuth authorization and sign in again.