CVE-2026-71433: LangGraph: Namespace prefix matching crosses segment boundaries in Postgres and SQLite stores

Published Aug 6, 2026
·
Updated

Summary

The Postgres and SQLite stores persist hierarchical namespaces as a dot-joined string (("memories", "alice") becomes memories.alice) and scoped reads by matching that string with LIKE '<path>%'. Because LIKE has no notion of the . separator, a scoped search or listnamespaces also matched sibling namespaces whose flattened form shares leading characters.

Applications commonly use the namespace as a tenant boundary. Where they do, a read scoped to one namespace could return items belonging to another, without any crafted input — an ordinary scoped request was sufficient.

We have no evidence of this behavior being exploited in the wild.

Affected users / systems

You may be affected if you:

- use PostgresStore/AsyncPostgresStore or SqliteStore/AsyncSqliteStore, and - rely on the namespace to separate data between users or tenants, and - have namespace labels where one is a prefix of another (1 and 12, alice and alice2), or labels containing or %

Applications whose namespace labels are fixed-length identifiers such as UUIDs, containing no or %, are not affected — no such label can be a prefix of another. InMemoryStore compares namespaces element-wise and is not affected.

Three distinct cases were possible:

- Sibling namespaces. A read scoped to ("foo",) also returned items under ("foobar",) and ("foo2",). - Unescaped pattern metacharacters. and % are legal namespace labels — only . is rejected — but were interpolated into the match pattern unescaped, so ("user1",) also matched ("userX1",). - Suffix conditions. listnamespaces(suffix=("alice",)) also matched the sibling leaf users.malice.

This is not SQL injection. Values were passed as bound parameters and never interpolated into statement text; the bound value was itself a LIKE pattern whose metacharacters were not neutralized.

Impact

- Confidentiality: disclosure of stored items belonging to namespaces outside the caller's intended scope, where namespaces are used as a tenant or user boundary. - No integrity or availability impact. get, put, and delete compare namespaces with = and were never affected; the issue is limited to read paths.

Patches / mitigation

Prefix scoping now matches the namespace exactly or requires the . separator before any remainder, pattern metacharacters in labels are escaped, and listnamespaces uses segment-aware matching for both prefix and suffix conditions.

On SQLite, the descendant match moved from LIKE to GLOB. LIKE is case-insensitive for ASCII in SQLite, so scoped reads previously matched namespaces differing only in case, while get/put/delete treated them as distinct. Search now agrees with them.

Upgrade to langgraph-checkpoint-postgres 3.1.1 or langgraph-checkpoint-sqlite 3.1.1.

Compatibility

in a listnamespaces match path now spans exactly one namespace segment. This restores the documented behavior — NamespacePath documents ("cache", "", "v1") as "any cache category with v1 version" — and matches InMemoryStore. Multi-segment matching was an artifact of translating into a SQL % wildcard, the same mechanism responsible for this issue, and could not be preserved while fixing it.

Callers relying on the previous behavior can express "match at any depth" by combining both match conditions, which are ANDed:

python listnamespaces(prefix=["uid"], suffix=["alice"])

Applications whose namespace labels cannot be prefixes of one another see no behavioral change.

Operational guidance

- Prefer fixed-length namespace labels such as UUIDs, so no label can be a prefix of another. - Where labels are user-supplied, validate them at the boundary rather than relying on scoping alone.

LangSmith / hosted deployments note

Unlike previous store advisories, this issue does reach hosted deployments. LangSmith deployments default to LANGGRAPHSTOREBACKEND=python, which uses AsyncPostgresStore from checkpoint-postgres. Deployments configured with LANGGRAPHSTOREBACKEND=grpc use a separate implementation that received an equivalent fix.

Other sources

LangGraph Checkpoint Postgres and SQLite Checkpoint are the Postgres and SQLite implementations of LangGraph's checkpoint saver. Prior to 3.1.1, the langgraph-checkpoint-postgres and langgraph-checkpoint-sqlite packages persisted hierarchical namespaces as a dot joined string and scoped reads by matching that string as a simple prefix pattern, so a read scoped to one namespace could also match a sibling namespace whose flattened form shares the same leading characters, or a namespace label containing unescaped pattern metacharacters, allowing an authenticated caller to retrieve stored items belonging to another tenant or user through an ordinary scoped search or list namespaces call, with no crafted input required. This issue is fixed in versions 3.1.1 of langgraph-checkpoint-postgres and langgraph-checkpoint-sqlite.

— MITRE

Affected Software

3 affected componentsFixes available
pip/langgraph-checkpoint-sqlite<3.1.1
3.1.1
pip/langgraph-checkpoint-postgres<3.1.1
3.1.1
IBM Concert Software<=1.0-3.0.1.1

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade pip/langgraph-checkpoint-sqlite to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 3.1.1
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade pip/langgraph-checkpoint-postgres to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 3.1.1
  3. Upgrade

    Upgrade langgraph-checkpoint-postgres to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 3.1.1
  4. Upgrade

    Upgrade langgraph-checkpoint-sqlite to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 3.1.1
  5. Configuration

    Prefer fixed-length namespace labels such as UUIDs so no label can be a prefix of another; if labels are user-supplied, validate them at the boundary rather than relying on scoping alone (avoid labels where one is a prefix of another like `1`/`12` or `alice`/`alice2`, and avoid labels containing `_` or `%`).

    Applications using namespace labels as tenant/user boundaries Namespace label validation / format = Prefer fixed-length identifiers (e.g., UUIDs) and validate user-supplied labels at the boundary

Event History

Aug 6, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·07:03 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·07:03 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Advisory Published
via GitHub·07:03 PM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·07:03 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software
Data Sourced
via NVD·10:18 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Oct 29, 2026
Data Sourced
via IBM·12:00 AM
DescriptionAffected Software

Parent advisories

This vulnerability appears in the following advisories.

Frequently Asked Questions

1

What is the severity of CVE-2026-71433?

The severity of CVE-2026-71433 is medium with a score of 5.3.

2

How do I fix CVE-2026-71433?

To fix CVE-2026-71433, update to the latest version of langgraph-checkpoint-sqlite or langgraph-checkpoint-postgres available.

3

What types of vulnerabilities are associated with CVE-2026-71433?

CVE-2026-71433 is associated with information leakage and SQL injection vulnerabilities.

4

Which software is affected by CVE-2026-71433?

CVE-2026-71433 affects the pip/langgraph-checkpoint-sqlite and pip/langgraph-checkpoint-postgres software packages.

5

What is the potential impact of CVE-2026-71433?

CVK-2026-71433 could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information due to inadequate namespace handling.

Contact

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