CVE-2026-71462: Automation-controller: automation-controller-container: automation-controller: custom_venv_path setting provides filesystem path-existence oracle on control pod

Published Aug 6, 2026
·
Updated

A flaw was found in automation-controller. The CUSTOMVENVPATHS setting field calls os.path.exists() on user-supplied paths without restriction. A superuser can ▎ determine the existence of arbitrary absolute filesystem paths on the controller-web pod by observing 200 vs 400 responses, enabling discovery of sensitive paths such as secret key files, Kubernetes service-account tokens, and receptor sockets. This is primarily impactful in managed AAP deployments where the tenant superuser is not the infrastructure operator.

Other sources

StringListPathField.tointernalvalue() calls os.path.exists() on unbounded user-supplied paths. 200 vs 400 response reveals existence of arbitrary absolute paths on the controller-web pod. Tenant superuser can confirm /etc/tower/SECRETKEY, k8s service-account token, receptor sockets, ConfigMap mount points. Mainly impactful on managed AAP (ansiblecloud.com) where tenant admin != host admin.

— MITRE

Affected Software

1 affected component
Red Hat Automation Controller

Event History

Aug 6, 2026
Data Sourced
via Red Hat·11:16 PM
DescriptionSeverityAffected Software
Sep 23, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·06:25 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·06:25 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·07:19 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Who can exploit this issue in practice?

An authenticated automation-controller superuser is required. The main exposure is in managed AAP environments where a tenant superuser is distinct from the infrastructure operator; an administrator who already controls the host has less to gain from the oracle.

2

What does an attacker need to do to exploit it?

The attacker supplies arbitrary absolute paths through the CUSTOM_VENV_PATHS setting. The response distinguishes existing paths from non-existing paths using 200 versus 400 responses, allowing filesystem path discovery on the controller-web pod.

3

What information can be exposed?

The issue reveals whether a requested path exists; it does not directly disclose file contents. A superuser can use it to confirm locations of sensitive resources such as /etc/tower/SECRET_KEY, Kubernetes service-account tokens, receptor sockets, and ConfigMap mount points.

4

How can administrators determine whether they may already be exposed?

Review who has superuser access to automation-controller, especially tenant administrators in managed deployments. The affected behavior is present if submitting an absolute path in CUSTOM_VENV_PATHS produces different 200 and 400 responses depending on whether that path exists on the controller-web pod.

Contact

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