CVE-2026-72183: landlock: Fix LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL bypass on the SIGIO path

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

landlock: Fix LANDLOCKSCOPESIGNAL bypass on the SIGIO path

LANDLOCKSCOPESIGNAL must prevent a sandboxed process from signaling processes outside its Landlock domain. It can be bypassed through the asynchronous SIGIO delivery path.

A sandboxed process that owns any file or socket can arm it with fcntl(fd, FSETOWN, -pgid), fcntl(fd, FSETSIG, SIGKILL) and OASYNC, so that an I/O event makes the kernel deliver the chosen signal to the whole process group. As the head of its process group's task list (the default position right after fork()) that group can also hold the non-sandboxed process that launched it, e.g. a supervisor or a security monitor. The sandbox can thus kill or signal the processes LANDLOCKSCOPESIGNAL is meant to protect from it.

The scope is enforced in hookfilesendsigiotask() against the Landlock domain recorded at FSETOWN time, not the live domain of the sender. controlcurrentfowner() decides whether to record that domain and skips recording it when the fowner target is in the caller's thread group, which is safe only for a single-task target (PIDTYPEPID, PIDTYPETGID). For a process group (PIDTYPEPGID) pidtask() returns only one member; recording is skipped whenever that member shares the caller's thread group, and hookfilesendsigiotask() then lets the signal fan out to the whole group unchecked.

Record the domain for every non single-process target so the scope is enforced against each group member at delivery time.

That recording is necessary but not sufficient on its own: the kernel signals a process group through its members' thread-group leaders, and the leader of the registrant's own process can carry a different Landlock domain than the sibling thread that armed the owner. domainisscoped() would then deny that leader, even though commit 18eb75f3af40 ("landlock: Always allow signals between threads of the same process") requires same-process delivery to be allowed. hooktaskkill() avoids this by evaluating samethreadgroup() live, per recipient; the SIGIO path instead delegates the whole decision to a single registration-time check, which a process-group fan-out cannot honor.

So also record the registrant's thread group next to its domain and exempt it at delivery: hookfilesendsigiotask() allows the signal whenever the recipient belongs to the registrant's own process, restoring the same-process guarantee while keeping out-of-domain group members blocked. The direct kill() path (hooktaskkill) already evaluates the live domain and is unaffected.

[mic: Check pidtype earlier and improve comment, fix commit message, fix comment formatting]