CVE-2026-72215: MIPS: DEC: Ensure 32-bit stack location for o32 prom_printf()

Published Aug 15, 2026
·
Updated

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

MIPS: DEC: Ensure 32-bit stack location for o32 promprintf()

In 64-bit configurations calling any firmware entry points from a kernel thread other than the initial one will result in a situation where the stack has been placed in the XKPHYS 64-bit memory segment.

Consequently the stack pointer is no longer a 32-bit value and when the 32-bit firmware code called uses 32-bit ALU operations to manipulate the stack pointer, the calculated result is incorrect (in fact in the 64-bit MIPS ISA almost all 32-bit ALU operations will produce an unpredictable result when executed on 64-bit data) and control goes astray.

This may happen when no final console driver has been enabled in the configuration and consequently the initial console continues being used late into bootstrap, or with an upcoming change that will switch the zs driver to use a platform device, which in turn will make the console handover happen only after other kernel threads have already been started, and the kernel will hang at:

pidmax: default: 32768 minimum: 301

or somewhat later, but always before:

cblistinitgeneric: Setting adjustable number of callback queues.

has been printed.

It seems that only the promprintf() entry point is affected. Of all the other entry points wired only rexslotaddress() and rexgettcinfo() are called from a kernel thread other than the initial one, specifically kernelinit(), and they are leaf functions that do no business with the stack, having worked with no issue ever since 64-bit support was added for the platform back in 2002.

To address this issue then, arrange for the stack to be switched in the o32 wrapper as required for promprintf() only, by supplying callo32() with a pointer to a chunk of initdata space, which is placed in the CKSEG0 32-bit compatibility segment, observing that promprintf() is only called from console output handler and therefore with the console lock held, implying no need for this code to be reentrant.

Other firmware entry points may be called with interrupts enabled and no lock held, and may therefore require that callo32() be reentrant. They trigger no issue at this point and "if it ain't broke, don't fix it," so just leave them alone.

Affected Software

1 affected component
Linux Kernel

Event History

Aug 15, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·05:54 AM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·05:54 AM
Description
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