CVE-2026-72300: ASoC: SOF: topology: validate vendor array size before parsing

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ASoC: SOF: topology: validate vendor array size before parsing

sofparsetokensets() reads array->size while iterating over topology private data. The loop condition only checks that some data remains, so a malformed topology with a truncated trailing vendor array can make the parser read the size field before a full vendor-array header is available.

Validate that the remaining private data contains a complete sndsoctplgvendorarray header before reading array->size.

The declared array size check also needs to remain signed. asize is an int, but sizeof(array) has type sizet, so comparing them directly promotes negative asize values to unsigned and lets them pass the check, as reported in the stable review thread reference below.

Cast sizeof(array) to int when validating the declared array size. This rejects negative, zero and otherwise too-small sizes before the parser dispatches to the tuple-specific code.