CVE-2026-73040: Dockge Path Traversal via Unvalidated Stack Name Allows Arbitrary Compose and .env Disclosure and Arbitrary Directory Deletion
Dockge validates a stack name only on the write path. In backend/stack.ts the allow-list check in validate(), which requires the name to match ^[a-z0-9-]+$, is reached from save() alone, while the path getter returns path.join(this.server.stacksDir, this.name) and Stack.getStack builds path.join(server.stacksDir, stackName) with no check. The socket handlers in backend/agent-socket-handlers/docker-socket-handler.ts confirm the caller is logged in and that the name is a string, then pass it straight to Stack.getStack, so a name containing traversal sequences resolves outside the managed stacks directory. An authenticated user can therefore read the composeENV and composeYAML values of any directory the server process can reach, which discloses the secrets in that directory's .env or Compose file, and can invoke delete(), which runs docker compose down and then fsAsync.rm on the traversed path with recursive and force set, removing that directory. Disclosure is limited to files named .env or an accepted Compose filename, and deletion requires the target directory to hold a valid Compose file so that docker compose down exits successfully. Dockge commonly runs as root with access to the Docker socket, so the reachable set includes unrelated applications on the host. Instances configured with disableAuth, a supported option that logs the caller in as admin automatically, expose both operations without authentication.
Affected Software
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What level of access does an attacker need?
The attacker must be logged in to Dockge and able to supply a stack name. No user interaction is required, and the affected socket handlers only verify that the caller is authenticated and that the name is a string.
What data can be disclosed?
An attacker can read composeENV and composeYAML values from directories outside the managed stacks directory that the server process can reach. Disclosure is limited to files named .env or an accepted Compose filename.
When can an attacker delete a traversed directory?
The target directory must contain a valid Compose file. Dockge runs docker compose down before recursively removing the resolved path, so deletion proceeds only if docker compose down succeeds.