CVE-2026-75612: yt-mcp: Path traversal in the add_attachment MCP tool allows arbitrary local file read and exfiltration

Published Nov 18, 2026
·
Updated

yt-mcp is a YouTrack MCP server for Claude Code. Prior to 1.18.1, addattachment in src/ytmcp/tools/attachments.py accepts a caller-controlled filepath, checks only that the file exists, reads it without directory confinement, and uploads the bytes to a YouTrack issue. A compromised MCP client or an LLM steered by indirect prompt injection can read any file accessible to the server process and exfiltrate secrets through an issue the caller can access. The same release also permits getprojecthealth to interpolate a caller-controlled project value into snapshot filenames, allowing parent-directory traversal to write JSON files outside the snapshots directory. This issue is fixed in version 1.18.1.

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade yt-mcp to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 1.18.1

Event History

Nov 18, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·09:34 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·09:34 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which deployments are exposed?

yt-mcp versions before 1.18.1 are affected. Exposure exists where an MCP client, or an LLM influenced by indirect prompt injection, can invoke the affected tools against the server.

2

What access does an attacker need?

No authentication or user interaction is required by the vulnerability itself, but the attacker must be able to cause calls to the MCP tools. For file disclosure, the target file must be readable by the yt-mcp server process and the attacker must be able to access the YouTrack issue used for the upload.

3

What is the impact beyond reading files?

The add_attachment tool can upload arbitrary readable local files to a YouTrack issue, enabling secret exfiltration. The get_project_health tool can use traversal in a caller-controlled project value to write JSON files outside its intended snapshots directory.

4

What should be done if immediate patching is not possible?

Restrict who and what can invoke the MCP tools, and prevent untrusted or prompt-influenced clients from supplying file paths or project values. Run yt-mcp with a minimally privileged account so it cannot read sensitive files or write to sensitive locations.

5

How can teams determine whether they are affected?

Check the deployed yt-mcp version; versions earlier than 1.18.1 are affected. Review whether add_attachment accepts caller-controlled file paths and whether get_project_health accepts caller-controlled project values in the running deployment.

Contact

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