CVE-2026-75981: TranslatePress – Translate Multilingual sites with AI Translation <= 3.2.5 - Unauthenticated Stored Cross-Site Scripting

Published Aug 19, 2026
·
Updated

The TranslatePress – Translate Multilingual sites with AI Translation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthenticated Stored Cross-Site Scripting in versions up to and including 3.2.5. The special gettext markers '#!trpst#' and '#!trpen#' are unconditionally rewritten to '<' and '>' by translatepage() in includes/class-translation-render.php (lines 538-539). Because those markers are plain text with no HTML-special characters, an unauthenticated attacker can embed them in a comment; the markers survive wpkses, and when the post is viewed in a secondary language the substitution turns the attacker's '#!trpst#img ... #!trpen#' into a real <img> tag. removetagsfromoutput() only strips <script>/<style>, so an <img onerror=...> executes in the visitor's browser.

Affected Software

1 affected component
TranslatePress TranslatePress – Translate Multilingual sites with AI Translation<=3.2.5

Event History

Aug 19, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·06:37 AM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·06:37 AM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness

Frequently Asked Questions

1

What conditions must be present for exploitation?

An unauthenticated attacker needs a way to submit content that is retained, such as a comment containing the #!trpst# and #!trpen# markers. The malicious content executes when a visitor views the affected post in a secondary language, where TranslatePress converts those markers into HTML angle brackets.

2

Are visitors to the primary-language version affected?

The described execution path requires the post to be viewed in a secondary language. The marker replacement occurs during page translation rendering.

3

What payload types are known to bypass the output filtering?

The described filtering removes script and style tags, but does not prevent an image element with an event handler. A marker-wrapped img tag with an onerror handler can therefore execute in the visitor's browser.

4

How can I check for prior exploitation?

Review retained comments and other user-submitted content for the literal strings #!trpst# and #!trpen#, especially where they surround HTML-like payloads. Such markers can be transformed into active HTML when the content is rendered in a secondary language.

Contact

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