CVE-2026-79657: NLTK before 3.10.3 Remote Code Execution via Unsafe Pickle Deserialization
Summary
The current source tree still allows arbitrary code execution during supposedly safer allowlisted pickle loading. The allowlist trusts whole module namespaces instead of exact safe globals, so crafted pickles can invoke dangerous in-namespace callables through pickle REDUCE.
Details
- Vulnerability type: Remote code execution via unsafe deserialization - Affected component: nltk.picklesec.allowlistedpickleload, nltk.tokenize.punkt.punktpickleload, nltk.parse.transitionparser.TransitionParser.parse - Affected versions: Current source v3.10.0-rc2; published 3.9.4 was not the claim target for this bypass. - Patched versions: Not yet patched - Root cause: Module-prefix allowlists include dangerous callables such as nltk.tokenize.repp.ReppTokenizer.execute and numpy.f2py.crackfortran.myeval.
punktpickleload() allowlists both nltk.tokenize.punkt and the whole nltk.tokenize namespace, which exposes ReppTokenizer.execute() and its subprocess.Popen(...) sink during unpickling. TransitionParser.parse() uses allowlistedpickleload(..., allowedmodules=("numpy", "scipy", "sklearn")), which permits numpy.f2py.crackfortran.myeval() and its attacker-controlled eval(...) path. I confirmed both gadgets create marker files before the caller returns or later aborts on type misuse.
PoC
Preconditions - The application loads an attacker-controlled tokenizer or model artifact through these public loaders.
Steps 1. Create a pickle whose REDUCE callable is ReppTokenizer.execute and point its command to a harmless marker-file write. 2. Pass that payload to punktpickleload(BytesIO(payload)) and observe the marker file is created during unpickling. 3. Create a second pickle whose REDUCE callable is numpy.f2py.crackfortran.myeval and load it through TransitionParser.parse(). 4. Observe the second marker file is created before TransitionParser.parse() later fails on the returned object type.
Minimal reproducible excerpt
text {'punktmarker': 'PUNKTRCE', 'transitionparsermarker': 'TPRCE'}
Impact
Any caller that trusts these current allowlisted loaders can still execute attacker-controlled commands while loading model or tokenizer artifacts. This defeats the protection mechanism that replaced unrestricted pickle loading and creates a dangerous false sense of safety.
Remediation
Replace broad module-prefix allowlists with exact (module, qualname) pairs for the few safe classes or functions genuinely required. Do not allow entire namespaces such as nltk.tokenize or numpy, and keep post-load type validation only as a secondary defense.
Resources
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/v3.10.0-rc2/nltk/tokenize/punkt.py#L120-L134 - https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/v3.10.0-rc2/nltk/tokenize/repp.py#L111-L115 - https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/v3.10.0-rc2/nltk/parse/transitionparser.py#L26-L30 - https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/v3.10.0-rc2/nltk/parse/transitionparser.py#L565-L571
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Fix + attack demonstration (verified)
+ tightened callers findclass now, before the allowlists: 1. Rejects any dotted name → closes 4489 with zero legit impact. 2. Denies dangerous modules (os, subprocess, sys, builtins, numpy.f2py, nltk.tokenize.repp, …) even under a broad allowedmodules — a defense-in-depth backstop so a future too-broad allowlist can't silently reopen RCE. 3. builtins denied wholesale; safe primitives (int, str, …) must be named exactly via allowedglobals.
Callers tightened: punkt drops the broad nltk.tokenize (keeps nltk.tokenize.punkt + exact collections.defaultdict/builtins.int); transitionparser keeps numpy/scipy/sklearn (array unpickling needs their submodules) with the new guards blocking the gadgets.
Full pickle-sink audit Every deserialization sink in the tree was reviewed: no raw pickle.load anywhere, and no joblib/numpy/torch/dill/yaml/marshal loaders. data.load + wordnetapp use RestrictedUnpickler (blocks all globals — safe); the remaining pickleload sites (chartparserapp, tbl/demo) load user-selected or self-written files and keep their warning.
Attack demonstration (captured; fork clone) === EXPLOITS blocked === 4489 sklearn.os.system (dotted) -> BLOCKED x99w numpy.f2py.crackfortran.myeval -> BLOCKED x99w nltk.tokenize.repp.execute -> BLOCKED backstop os.system (os allowlisted) -> BLOCKED backstop builtins.eval (exact global)-> BLOCKED === LEGIT loads still work === punkt round-trip via punktpickleload -> OK builtins.int (safe primitive) -> OK
Tests testpickleallowlistsecurity.py — added 5 regressions (dotted traversal, both namespace gadgets, denied-module backstop, legit round-trip). Suite: 122 passed / 9 skipped (sklearn-dependent) across pickle/punkt/transition/tokenize. pre-commit (black/isort/ruff) clean.
Other sources
Arbitrary code execution in protobufjs. protobufjs compiles protobuf definitions into JS functions. Attackers can manipulate these definitions to execute arbitrary JS code.
— IBM
NLTK versions before 3.10.3 contain a remote code execution vulnerability in allowlisted pickle loaders that trust entire module namespaces instead of specific safe callables. Attackers can craft malicious pickle payloads invoking dangerous in-namespace functions like ReppTokenizer.execute and numpy.f2py.crackfortran.myeval through pickle REDUCE to execute arbitrary commands during model or tokenizer artifact loading.
— NVD
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
pip/nltkto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 3.10.3 - Configuration
Replace broad module-prefix allowlists with exact (module, qualname) pairs for only the safe classes or functions required; do not allow entire namespaces such as nltk.tokenize or numpy. Tighten punkt_pickle_load to retain nltk.tokenize.punkt plus exact collections.defaultdict and builtins.int, and retain the required numpy/scipy/sklearn support in TransitionParser.parse only with the new guards.
NLTK allowlisted pickle loaders allowed_globals = exact (module, qualname) pairs - Configuration
Reject any dotted name, deny builtins wholesale except safe primitives explicitly named in allowed_globals, and deny dangerous modules and callables including os, subprocess, sys, builtins, numpy.f2py, nltk.tokenize.repp, ReppTokenizer._execute, and numpy.f2py.crackfortran.myeval—even when a broad allowed_modules value is supplied.
NLTK allowlisted pickle loaders dangerous-global and name rejection = deny
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are exposed?
Deployments using NLTK versions earlier than 3.10.3 are exposed when they load model or tokenizer artifacts through the affected allowlisted pickle loaders. The risk is especially relevant where an attacker can cause a crafted artifact to be loaded.
What does an attacker need to exploit this issue?
An attacker needs to provide or make the target load a malicious pickle payload. The vulnerability has a network attack vector and requires no privileges or user interaction according to the supplied severity vector.
What is the immediate remediation?
Upgrade NLTK to version 3.10.3 or later. Until upgrading is possible, avoid loading untrusted model or tokenizer artifacts through the affected pickle-loading paths.