CVE-2026-79747: MCPHub vulnerable to SSRF: a non-admin user can make mcphub request arbitrary URLs and read the response (OpenAPI proxy + transport dial)
MCPHub is a unified hub for centrally managing and dynamically orchestrating multiple MCP servers/APIs into separate endpoints with flexible routing strategies. Prior to version 1.0.32, an authenticated non-admin user can register a server pointing at an arbitrary URL and make the hub issue server-side requests to it, with no egress filtering (no block of loopback / RFC1918 / link-local 169.254.0.0/16). Via the OpenAPI proxy path the response body is returned to the caller (full, reflected SSRF); via the SSE/streamable-http transport the request is sent blind. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.32.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
MCPHubto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 1.0.32 - Compensating control
If you cannot upgrade immediately, add egress filtering for MCPHub to block loopback, RFC1918 private ranges, and link-local 169.254.0.0/16 so registered servers cannot force server-side requests to arbitrary internal addresses.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who can exploit this issue?
Any authenticated MCPHub user with non-admin privileges can register a server that points to an arbitrary URL. No administrator role is required.
What internal targets may be reachable?
The affected versions do not apply egress filtering for loopback, RFC1918 private-address ranges, or link-local addresses in 169.254.0.0/16. This can allow requests to services reachable from the MCPHub server.
Can an attacker read data returned by the target?
Yes, requests made through the OpenAPI proxy path return the response body to the attacker, enabling reflected SSRF. Requests through the SSE/streamable-http transport are sent without returning the response body.
What version fixes the issue?
The issue is patched in MCPHub version 1.0.32. Versions prior to 1.0.32 are affected.